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INTRODUCTION 
In the early hours of December 28, 2014, a seventeen-year-old 
transgender girl named Leelah Alcorn left her home in Kings Mills, 
Ohio, and walked three miles to Interstate 71.1  Before leaving, 
Alcorn had set up her Tumblr2 account to automatically upload a post 
entitled “Suicide Note.”3  At 2:20 AM, Alcorn walked onto the six-
lane highway and stepped in front of a tractor-trailer.4  A few hours 
later, the post appeared on Alcorn’s Tumblr page: “If you are reading 
this, it means that I have committed suicide and obviously failed to 
delete this post from my queue.”5 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Tracy Connor, ‘Fix Society’: Transgender Teen Leelah Alcorn Posted Plea 
Before Suicide, NBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2014, 4:44 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fix-society-transgender-teen-leelah-alcorn-
posted-plea-suicide-n277666 [https://perma.cc/JXM2-Z829]; Hayley MacMillen, 
Trans Teen Leaves Tumblr Suicide Note Before Her Death, REFINERY29 (Apr. 29, 
2015, 6:50 PM), http://www.refinery29.com/2014/12/80149/leelah-alcorn-trans-
teenager-suicide-letter [https://perma.cc/WV67-YH5D]; Gillian Moheny, Leelah 
Alcorn: Transgender Teen’s Reported Suicide Note Makes Dramatic Appeal, ABC 
NEWS (Dec. 31, 2014, 1:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/leelah-alcorn-transgender-
teens-reported-suicide-note-makes/story?id=27912326 [https://perma.cc/6ZUP-
ADU7]. 
 2. Tumblr is a social media platform where individuals can post public blog 
posts. See TUMBLR, http://www.tumblr.com [https://perma.cc/9DGP-656J]. 
 3. MacMillen, supra note 1. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Fallon Fox, Leelah Alcorn’s Suicide: Conversion Therapy Is Child Abuse, 
TIME (Jan. 8, 2015), http://time.com/3655718/leelah-alcorn-suicide-transgender-
therapy [https://perma.cc/P8DE-595P] (linking to the actual note at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150102043958/http://lazerprincess.tumblr.com 
[https://perma.cc/X7K9-3GF7]). 
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In her post, Alcorn explained why she chose to take her life.6  She 
described the feelings of gender nonconformity she had experienced 
since she was four, and the joy she felt when she found an explanation 
for these feelings.7  “When I was 14,” Alcorn wrote, “I learned what 
transgender meant and cried of happiness.  After 10 years of 
confusion I finally understood who I was.”8  In her post, Alcorn also 
explained how her parents did not accept her identity, and the toll this 
took on her.9  Alcorn’s letter stated, “[w]hen I was 16 I realized that 
my parents would never come around, and that I would have to wait 
until I was 18 to start any sort of transitioning treatment, which 
absolutely broke my heart.  The longer you wait, the harder it is to 
transition.  I felt hopeless, that I was just going to look like a man in 
drag for the rest of my life.”10  Alcorn ended her post by stating: “My 
death needs to mean something.  My death needs to be counted in the 
number of transgender people who commit suicide this year.  I want 
someone to look at that number and say ‘that’s fucked up’ and fix it.  
Fix society.  Please.”11 
Alcorn’s death drew widespread attention from media outlets and 
advocacy groups.  Commentators wrote that Alcorn’s letter shed light 
on the painful experience that many transgender youth face.12  
Reports of the incident cited the disproportionately high rate of 
suicide attempts among transgender youth.13  Prominent transgender 
writers and actors, such as Laverne Cox, described their own suicide 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See, e.g., Jennifer Finney Boylan, How to Save Your Life: A Response to 
Leelah Alcorn’s Suicide Note, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2015, at A23; Zack Ford, Leelah 
Alcorn and the Quiet Genocide of Transgender People, THINK PROGRESS (Dec. 31, 
2014, 1:33 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2014/12/31/3607382/leelah-alcorn-
transgender-genocide [https://perma.cc/37P9-VVW6]; Kat Haché, What Leelah 
Alcorn’s Death Means to Me As a Transgender Woman and Advocate, BUSTLE 
(Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.bustle.com/articles/56324-what-leelah-alcorns-death-
means-to-me-as-a-transgender-woman-and-advocate; Emma Margolin, Leelah 
Alcorn’s Suicide Note Pointed Out Societal Problems, MSNBC (Jan. 3, 2015, 4:01 
PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/leelah-alcorns-suicide-note-pointed-out-societal-
problems [https://perma.cc/7FWZ-ZZ5H]. 
 13. Arnold H. Grossman & Anthony R. D’Augelli, Transgender Youth and Life-
Threatening Behaviors, 35 SUICIDE & LIFE THREATENING BEHAV. 527, 532 (2007) 
(finding that forty-five percent of participants had seriously considered committing 
suicide, and twenty-six percent had engaged in life-threatening behavior such as 
suicide attempts). 
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attempts to bring more attention to the issue.14  With this publicity, 
Alcorn’s death became a part of a larger conversation about 
transgender rights and gender-affirming policies.15  Some 
commentators argued that improved access to the gender-affirming 
healthcare that Alcorn sought could reduce the suicide attempt rate 
among transgender youth and ultimately save lives.16 
Health organizations such as the American Psychiatric Association 
(APA),17 the World Health Organization,18 the American Medical 
Association (AMA),19 the Endocrine Society,20 the American 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Beth Sherouse, Laverne Cox on Leelah Alcorn and Transgender Youth on 
The View, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN BLOG (Jan. 9, 2105), 
http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/laverne-cox-on-leelah-alcorn-and-transgender-youth-
on-the-view [https://perma.cc/6LJ7-SRSH]. 
 15. In the wake of Alcorn’s death, advocates petitioned Congress to ban 
“conversion therapy”—psychotherapy aimed at changing an individual’s gender 
identity or sexual orientation—which Alcorn’s parents forced her to attend. See 
Mitch Kellaway, Petition for ‘Leelah’s Law’ Banning Conversion Therapy Heads to 
White House, ADVOCATE (Jan. 30, 2015, 3:21 PM), 
http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2015/01/30/petition-leelahs-law-
banning-conversion-therapy-heads-white-house [https://perma.cc/C6EH-U7JU].  A 
congresswoman drafted a Concurrent Resolution that “encourages each state to 
protect minors from efforts that promote or promise to change sexual orientation, 
gender identity, or gender expression, based on the premise that being lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, or gender nonconforming is a mental illness or developmental 
disorder that can or should be cured.” H.R. Con. Res. 36, 114th Cong. (2015).  
Alcorn’s death has also brought more light to the violence that transwomen are 
subjected to as commentators noted the disproportionate media attention that 
Alcorn’s death received when compared to the growing trend of murders of 
transgender women of color. Eunbyul Lee, Who Gets To Be Human in Death?: 
Leelah Alcorn and Trans Legacies, BLACK GIRL DANGEROUS (Jan. 6, 2015), 
http://www.blackgirldangerous.org/2015/01/gets-human-death-leelah-alcorn-trans-
legacies [https://perma.cc/GNW9-MGVF] (noting that while transgender people of 
color face disproportionately high murder and violence rates compared to white 
transgender people, media coverage is racially fragmented: “While everyone is quick 
to circulate petitions online in Leelah’s name and be distinguished as allies for the 
trans community, why do they continue to turn a blind eye to the lives and deaths of 
trans women of color? . . .  When we fail to illuminate the dimmed narratives of trans 
people of color while advocating for justice exclusively for white trans people, we 
further notions of white supremacy.”). 
 16. Margolin, supra note 12.  See infra Part I, for a discussion of gender-affirming 
healthcare. 
 17. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 451–59 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V]. 
 18. International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2015), 
http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2015/en#/F60-F69 
[https://perma.cc/FCN9-XENV] (classifying transsexualism and gender identity 
disorder of childhood in adult mental and behavioral disorders). 
 19. AM. MED. ASS’N, HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 122: REMOVING 
FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO CARE FOR TRANSGENDER PATIENTS 1 (2008) [hereinafter 
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Academy of Family Physicians,21 the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the American Psychological 
Association have recognized a form of anxiety, termed gender 
dysphoria (GD), that results from a discrepancy between an 
individual’s sex identity assigned at birth and their gender identity.22  
Mental health experts note that GD can exist during childhood and 
adolescence and that gender-affirming healthcare can alleviate GD.23  
Indeed, mental health organizations, such as AMA, have noted the 
seriousness of GD and the medical necessity of gender-affirming 
healthcare for certain individuals.24  Without access to gender-
affirming healthcare, individuals experiencing GD may develop 
“clinically significant psychological distress, dysfunction, debilitating 
depression, and . . . suicidality.25”  Thus, gender-affirming healthcare 
may be necessary for at least some adolescents.  Given the experience 
of transgender youth like Leelah Alcorn, it is imperative for policy 
makers to consider adolescent access to medically necessary gender-
affirming healthcare. 
The psychological effects of GD raise important concerns for 
policymakers considering whether adolescents should have access to 
medically necessary gender-affirming healthcare.  In particular, 
municipal governments and urban policymakers have an interest in 
considering the costs and benefits of providing access to gender-
                                                                                                                 
AMA RESOLUTION 122] (finding that “[a]n established body of medical research 
demonstrates the effectiveness and medical necessity of mental health care, hormone 
therapy and sex reassignment surgery as forms of therapeutic treatment for many 
people diagnosed with [GD]”). 
 20. WYLIE C. HEMBREE ET AL., ENDOCRINE SOC’Y, ENDOCRINE TREATMENT OF 
TRANSSEXUAL PERSONS: AN ENDOCRINE SOCIETY CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINE 7 
(2009), 
https://www.endocrine.org/~/media/endosociety/Files/Publications/Clinical%20Practi
ce%20Guidelines/Endocrine-Treatment-of-Transsexual-Persons.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JJ7V-P7RE] (providing a definition for “Gender Identity Disorder” 
that tracks the definition in the DSM-IV). 
 21. AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, RESOLUTION NO. 1004 (May 3, 2012), 
http://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/about_us/special_constituencies/2012RC
AR_Advocacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/E93B-JPV3]. 
 22. M. Dru Levasseur, Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the Law to Reflect 
Modern Medical Science Is Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 943, 953–54 
(2015). 
 23. DSM-V, supra note 17, at 451–59; WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER 
HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, 
AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 8 (7th ed. 2012) [hereinafter WPATH]. 
 24. AMA RESOLUTION 122, supra note 19. 
 25. Id. 
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affirming healthcare to transgender individuals and youth.26  Urban 
areas possess a high density of transgender individuals, including 
transgender youth, since the geographic distribution of transgender 
and gender non-conforming individuals roughly mirrors that of the 
overall U.S. population.27  In addition, studies suggest that the 
transgender population may be disproportionally eligible for 
Medicaid due to the disparities in income and unemployment that are 
likely the result of transphobia.28  As a result, the urban transgender 
population consists of many individuals who are eligible for Medicaid 
and other services.  Transgender youth may be particularly vulnerable 
and in need of medical services in urban areas, as reports on runaway 
homeless youth populations suggest that transgender youth are 
disproportionally represented in the homeless population.29  These 
youth typically move to urban areas where identity-based homeless 
services organizations that are best prepared to serve transgender 
youth are based.30  Municipal governments and urban policymakers 
therefore have a particular interest in trans youth31 access to gender-
affirming healthcare. 
Despite the medical community’s recognition that gender-affirming 
healthcare is medically necessary for certain transgender youth, many 
are unable to gain access to it.  Some, like Alcorn, are deterred from 
transitioning by their parents or families, while others find that they 
                                                                                                                 
 26. JAMIE M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, 
INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER 
DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 10 (2011), 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XAP8-XCGD]. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Levasseur, supra note 22, at 949–51.  “Transphobia” may be defined to mean 
negative attitudes directed towards trans people because of their transgender 
identity. Talia Mae Bettcher, Transphobia, 1 TSQ: TRANSGENDER STUD. Q. 249, 249 
(2014). 
 29. NICHOLAS RAY, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY INST., LESBIAN, 
GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH: AN EPIDEMIC OF HOMELESSNESS 4 
(2006), http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/HomelessYouth.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8F2R-GLU3]; see also NICO SIFRA QUINTANA ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS, ON THE STREETS: THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO GAY AND TRANSGENDER 
HOMELESS YOUTH 1 (June 2010), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2010/06/pdf/lgbtyouthhomelessness.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C9E2-D3B4]. 
 30. QUINTANA ET AL., supra note 29, at 17. 
 31. “Trans youth” is a common shorthand for transgender youth. See generally 
Sonja Shield, The Doctor Won’t See You Now: Rights of Transgender Adolescents 
to Sex Reassignment Treatment, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 361 (2007). 
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cannot afford the costly treatments and appointments.32  While many 
private insurers have begun to cover gender-affirming healthcare,33 
the majority of state Medicaid programs do not.34  Thus, in recent 
years, trans-rights activists have advocated for greater access to 
gender-affirming healthcare.  New York, California, Vermont, 
Oregon, Massachusetts, and Washington D.C. have lifted the bans in 
their Medicaid programs for coverage of gender-affirming healthcare, 
but several of these states restrict coverage on the basis of age, 
requiring individuals to wait until they are eighteen to receive 
treatment.35 
Given the importance of gender-affirming healthcare for 
transgender youth, this Note considers whether age-based restrictions 
on Medicaid coverage of this healthcare are necessary and good 
policy.  Part I of this Note provides context for the policy and law 
regarding gender-affirming healthcare and discusses the terms and 
rhetorical framing that mental health experts, trans-rights advocates, 
and legislators use to describe gender-affirming healthcare.  In 
addition, it outlines the empirical research that supports the 
commonly held view of the mental health field that gender-affirming 
healthcare may be a medical necessity for transgender individuals.  
Lastly, it outlines the three approaches that states have taken to cover 
or exclude gender-affirming healthcare from Medicaid. 
Part II examines the New York Medicaid program, which restricts 
coverage of gender-affirming healthcare on the basis of age.  This 
Part also identifies the ways in which an age-based exclusion for 
Medicaid coverage of medically necessary treatment may conflict 
                                                                                                                 
 32. MARY ANN HORTON, OUT & EQUAL WORKPLACE SUMMIT, THE COST OF 
TRANSGENDER HEALTH BENEFITS 4 (2008), 
http://www.tgender.net/taw/thb/THBCost-OE2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8TJ-ZJ4Z] 
(noting that the overall cost of medically necessary surgeries by United States 
transsexuals was $19.3 million in 2001); Samantha Leal, I Can’t Afford to Transition: 
The Unseen Costs of Being Transgender in 2015, MARIE CLAIRE (July 21, 2015), 
http://www.marieclaire.com/culture/news/a15164/transgender-operation-procedure-
costs/ [https://perma.cc/CAZ8-FVXC]. 
 33. Finding Insurance for Transgender-Related Healthcare, HUM. RTS. 
CAMPAIGN (Aug. 1, 2015), http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/finding-insurance-for-
transgender-related-healthcare [https://perma.cc/3ZP3-VJL5]. 
 34. Jennifer L. Casazza, Sex Reassignment Surgery: Required for Transgendered 
Prisoners but Forbidden for Medicaid, Medicare, and CHAMPUS Beneficiaries, 20 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 625, 642–45 (2014). 
 35. See George Liam Steptoe, Gender-Affirming Coverage for Transgender 
People Under Proposed Medicaid Reform, NY CITY LENS (Feb. 5, 2015), 
http://nycitylens.com/2015/02/how-cuomos-medicaid-reforms-can-help-the-
transgender-community/ [https://perma.cc/HU3S-RG4Y]; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES 
R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 505.2(l)(1)-(l)(2) (2016). 
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with the doctrine of informed consent, thereby potentially giving rise 
to litigation under the Affordable Care Act and enforcement actions 
by the Department of Health and Human Services. 
Finally, Part III of this Note asserts that amending Medicaid 
programs to cover gender-affirming healthcare for transgender youth 
on a case-by-case basis would avoid the issues that an age-based 
exclusion presents.  This Part argues that a case-by-case approach 
would align with the doctrine of informed consent and its exceptions, 
avoid litigation by providing medically necessary coverage in a non-
discriminatory manner, and prevent the negative outcomes that beset 
too many transgender youth. 
I.  MEDICAID COVERAGE OF GENDER-AFFIRMING 
HEALTHCARE 
As trans-rights advocates have pushed discussion of gender beyond 
a binary formulation, the rhetorical framing of gender and gender-
affirming healthcare has become increasingly central.  This Part 
provides background on gender-affirming healthcare and the 
language and terms that this Note will use to describe gender-
affirming healthcare and the treatment of GD.  In addition, this Part 
details the widely held medical consensus regarding transgender-
related healthcare and the approaches health professionals have 
found that can alleviate the distress caused by GD.  Last, this Part 
describes the extent to which states have extended Medicaid coverage 
for gender-affirming healthcare and will describe the age-based 
restrictions in New York’s Medicaid regulation. 
A. Definitions and Terms Used to Discuss Gender-Affirming 
Healthcare 
Language that categorizes and defines people on the basis of sex 
and gender both frames society’s outlook on sex and is subject to 
society’s cultural values.36  Such language runs the risk of instilling or 
reinforcing systems of sexual inequality and normativity.37  For 
instance, a binary understanding of sex and gender that categorizes all 
individuals as either male or female on the basis of criteria founded 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See GENNY BEEMYN & SUSAN RANKIN, THE LIVES OF TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 
16 (2011). 
 37. See id. at 17; see also Mary Alice Adams, Traversing the Transcape: A Brief 
Historical Etymology of Trans* Terminology, in TRANSGENDER COMMUNICATION 
STUDIES: HISTORIES, TRENDS, AND TRAJECTORIES 173, 179–81 (2015) (noting that 
language works to frame narratives about transgender identity “in a manner that 
privileges hegemonic cisnormativity”). 
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on ideas of “maleness” and “femaleness” works to marginalize 
individuals who do not meet these criteria.38  Advocates of 
transgender rights have thus pushed for changes in terminology to 
counter this marginalization.39  In particular, trans-rights activists and 
queer linguists have used language as a means of challenging a binary 
understanding of gender and the view of gender nonconformity as a 
mental illness or disorder.40  In this manner, language may be viewed 
as not merely descriptive, but political, and some scholars argue that 
all language that categorizes or classifies transgender people, by its 
nature, is not neutral.41  The terms used to classify medical treatments 
that are medically necessary for many transgender individuals are 
similarly not neutral and risk pathologizing gender-nonconformity.42 
The notion of sex is central to any discussion involving the 
recognition of transgender rights under the law.  A common 
misconception of sex is that it is assigned at birth as either male or 
female on the basis of external genitalia.43  Genitalia, however, is not 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes, Revisited, 40 SCIENCES 18, 23 (2000) 
(arguing that “one can find levels of masculinity and femininity in almost every 
possible permutation” and that “[t]he medical and scientific communities have yet to 
adopt a language that is capable of describing such diversity . . . . Hence legal 
protection for people whose cultural and physical genitals do not match is needed 
during the current transition to a more gender-diverse world.”). 
 39. Adams, supra note 37, at 179 (arguing for the development of more gender 
terms as a means of conferring existence and that the “absence of a gender label that 
fits may feel like symbolic annihilation”). 
 40. WPATH, supra note 23, at 5 (noting that “[a] disorder is a description of 
something with which a person might struggle, not a description of the person or the 
person’s identity”). 
 41. BEEMYN & RANKIN, supra note 36, at 16–17 (citing J. WOOD, GENDERED 
LIVES: COMMUNICATION, GENDER AND CULTURE (2d ed. 1997)). 
 42. Id. at 16–17.  While acknowledging the political implications of rhetorical 
framing, this Note addresses state regulations that bar access to gender-affirming 
healthcare on the basis of particular nomenclature and classifications.  The terms 
used in this Note are not intended to marginalize, impose cultural norms, or 
pathologize gender nonconforming identities.  However, in order to clearly address 
the statutes, it will be necessary to use the terms of these regulations and even adopt 
their framing of gender dysphoria in a manner which may appear to pathologize the 
experience of gender non-conforming and transgender individuals.  For example, 
discussing “treatment” of GD as a medical need may work to pathologize the 
transgender experience or suggest that gender nonconformity requires medical 
attention. 
 43. Levasseur, supra note 22, at 982–83 (citing Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male 
and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 265, 278–79 (1999)) (arguing that separating tangible sex characteristics for 
psychological sex characteristics “reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of sex. 
The etiology of sex reveals that it is a multi-faceted determination.”). 
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the sole factor determining one’s sex.44  Medical experts define sex on 
the basis of at least eight attributes, including an individual’s internal 
morphologic sex, external genitalia, gonadal sex, chromosomal sex, 
phenotypic sex (secondary sex characteristics), hormonal sex, 
assigned sex, and gender identity.45  The problematic formulation of 
sex on the basis of genitalia, or other physical characteristics, alone is 
seen in the experience of intersex individuals.46  Roughly 1.7% of the 
world’s population does not conform to chromosomal, gonadal, 
hormonal, or genital standards for either assigned sex.47  Such 
individuals are often subjected to medical interventions, including 
surgery while they are still infants, so as to make their genitals more 
easily reflect male or female genitalia.48  Given the uncertainty of 
whether such “corrective” procedures are necessary, and the reality 
that gender identity may not “match” the sex assigned through 
surgery, scholars argue that these interventions are merely 
justifications for classifying people as one sex or the other.49  
Psychologists have thus begun to understand sexual identity as 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. (“Sex determinations have not always been based on ‘genital 
shorthand.’”). 
 45. JULIE GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: WHY SEX MATTERS 11 
(2012) (citing Melanie Blackless et al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review 
and Synthesis, 12 AM. J. HUM. BIOLOGY 151, 161 (2000)); see also WPATH, supra 
note 23, at 97 (defining the term “sex”). 
 46. Ilana Gelfman, Because of Intersex: Intersexuality, Title VII, and the Reality 
of Discrimination “Because of . . . [Perceived] Sex”, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 55, 62 (2010) (“[T]he intersex body fits the definition of neither a male nor a 
female body—and that it defies the gender binary so commonly assumed by 
individuals and the law.”). 
 47. BEEMYN & RANKIN, supra note 36, at 18; see also PEGGY T. COHEN-KETTENIS 
& FRIEDMAN PFÄFFLIN, TRANSGENDERISM AND INTERSEXUALITY IN CHILDHOOD 
AND ADOLESCENCE 24, 41 (2003) (“[E]stimates of intersexuality climb to include 
nearly two percent of the population.”). 
 48. The practice of “corrective” surgeries for intersex infants is common. See Noa 
Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change: A Struggle for Intersex and Transsex 
Liberties, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 51, 60–61 (2006) (citing Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, 
Evaluation of the Newborn with Developmental Anomalies of the External 
Genitalia, 106 PEDIATRICS 138, 139 (2000)); see also BEEMYN & RANKIN, supra note 
36, at 18.  Pediatric guidelines advise for the injection of testosterone or the removal 
of testes where the child is born with a penis less than two centimeters. Id.  Similarly, 
medical standards do not allow clitorises larger than 0.9 centimeters at birth. Id.; see 
also Chineyere Ezie, Deconstructing the Body: Transgender and Intersex Identities 
and Sex Discrimination – The Need for Strict Scrutiny, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
141, 146–47 (2011) (discussing the standards that determine a “normal” clitoris or 
“adequate” penis that need not be operated on in order to “ensure that intersex 
patients end up [as] functioning heterosexuals”).   
 49. See, e.g., BEEMYN & RANKIN, supra note 36, at 18–19. 
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consisting of a greater number of factors, any of which may be 
determinative.50 
Gender identity, in contrast, is not assigned, but is rather a person’s 
own intrinsic sense of being male, female, or an alternative gender.51  
For most individuals, gender identity is sufficiently close to their 
assigned sex so as to be consistent with their gender expression.52  The 
term “cisgender” is used to describe people whose gender identity is 
aligned with their sex assignment at birth.53  However, the gender 
identity of some individuals differs from the normative expectations 
of their assigned sex.54  Centering gender identity on the individual’s 
own sense of self allows for a more nuanced and accurate 
understanding of gender and properly acknowledges that gender-
nonconforming individuals may cross-identify with either gender or 
may not conform to a binary understanding of gender at all.55 
GD, formerly known as gender identity disorder,56 is understood by 
the medical community as mental distress caused by a discrepancy 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. at 17. 
 51. Individuals may identify outside the binary of male and female and, instead, 
identify with an alternative gender identity or identities.  Given the emphasis on 
defining one’s own gender identity, the labels for gender nonconforming identities 
are not comprehensive, may overlap, and likely work to confound and confuse 
notions of a gender binary.  Some labels include agender, genderqueer, bigender, 
trigender, neutrois, genderfluid, trans, transmasculine, transfeminine, bear, butch, 
femme, boi, demiboy, demigirl, genderfree, and androgyne. WPATH, supra note 23, 
at 96; Adams, supra note 37, at 179–81; Vanessa Vitiello Urquhart, What the Heck Is 
Genderqueer?, SLATE (Mar. 24, 2015, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/03/24/genderqueer_what_does_it_mean_an
d_where_does_it_come_from.html [https://perma.cc/2JS6-JQZA]; Some 
Genderqueer Identities, GENDER QUEERIES: FOR ALL YOUR GENDERQUEER AND 
NON-BINARY NEEDS, http://genderqueeries.tumblr.com/identities 
[https://perma.cc/8XZT-MBV8]. 
 52. Shuvo Ghosh, Gender Identity, MEDSCAPE (Mar. 16, 2016), 
http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/917990-overview [https://perma.cc/HA5V-
55P4]; see WPATH, supra note 23, at 97. 
 53. Cisgender is a useful term as it challenges cisnormativity, or the cultural 
notion that it is “normal” for one’s gender identity to align with one’s sex assignment 
at birth.  The term is derived from the Latin root cis, meaning “on the same side as.”  
B. Aultman, Cisgender, 1 TSQ: TRANSGENDER STUD. Q. 61, 61 (2014), 
http://tsq.dukejournals.org/content/1/1-2/61.full.pdf+html?sid=0a257206-1e7b-4d01-
baf6-16ebfb5e3d6b; see also Julia Serano, Keynote lecture presented at the 8th 
Annual Philadelphia Trans-Health Conference: Psychology, Sexualization and Trans-
Invalidations (Jun. 12, 2009), http://www.juliaserano.com/av/Serano-
TransInvalidations.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5Y3-YF64]. 
 54. WPATH, supra note 23, at 97. 
 55. BEEMYN & RANKIN, supra note 36, at 20. 
 56. The APA renamed Gender Identity Disorder as Gender Dysphoria in 2013 as 
part of its release of the DSM-V. Gender Dysphoria Fact Sheet, AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N (2013) 
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between a person’s gender identity and that person’s assigned sex.57  
GD is listed in the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-V),58 which is the standard classification 
system for mental disorders that mental health professionals in the 
United States use.59  GD has been the subject of mental health studies 
for more than thirty years.60  Studies have found that GD can be 
alleviated with individual treatment, which may or may not include 
physical interventions such as hormone therapy or surgeries.61  
Indeed, the APA and AMA have acknowledged that gender-
affirming healthcare may be necessary to alleviate GD.62  It is 
important to note, however, that not all individuals who are gender-
nonconforming experience GD, nor will all individuals who 
experience GD require physical interventions.63  Further, health 
professionals have made clear that GD is to be distinguished from 
gender nonconformity.64  Gender nonconformity, as an identity, is not 
to be understood as a mental disorder, while GD, which entails a 
feeling of distress or anxiety, may be understood as clinically 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.dsm5.org/documents/gender%20dysphoria%20fact%20sheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M4GM-97HR].  The APA made this decision because it sought to 
reclassify gender identity disorder with a term that would protect transgender 
individuals’ “access to care and [would not] be used against them in social, 
occupational, or legal areas.” Id.  Additionally, the APA noted that “replacing 
‘disorder’ with ‘dysphoria’ in the diagnostic label is not only more appropriate and 
consistent with familiar clinical sexology terminology, it also removes the connotation 
that the patient is ‘disordered.’” Id.  It is also worth noting that the APA considered 
removing the condition from the DSM-V but was concerned that doing so would 
jeopardize access to care. Id. 
 57. WPATH, supra note 23, at 96 (defining the term “gender dysphoria”). 
 58. DSM-V, supra note 17, at 451–59. 
 59. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm [https://perma.cc/9VNC-
YN6C]. 
 60. See Ciaran Judge et al., Gender Dysphoria—Prevalence and Co-Morbidities 
in an Irish Adult Population, 5 FRONTIERS IN ENDOCRINOLOGY 1, 3 (2014). 
 61. WPATH, supra note 23, at 5. 
 62. AMA RESOLUTION 122, supra note 19 (finding that treatment for GD is 
medically necessary); Gunter Heylens et al., Effects of Different Steps in Gender 
Reassignment Therapy on Psychopathology: A Prospective Study of Persons with a 
Gender Identity Disorder, 11 J. MED. 119, 123–24 (2014) (finding that sex-affirming 
surgery lowered the overall level of psychoneurotic distress in individuals displaying 
signs of GD, to levels that of the general population). 
 63. Heylens et al., supra note 62, at 124. 
 64. Id. 
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significant distress that warrants mental health treatment.65  The APA 
has recognized that children and adolescents may experience GD.66 
The phrase gender-affirming healthcare refers to all psychological 
and medical procedures or treatments necessary to treat GD, 
including hormone therapy and gender-affirming surgery.  While 
gender-affirming healthcare is also often referred to as transition-
related healthcare, or gender transition healthcare, the use of gender-
affirming healthcare may be most in line with the goal of GD 
treatment: to affirm an individual’s gender identity.67  Gender-
affirming surgery, also termed gender reassignment surgery or sex 
reassignment surgery, refers to surgical interventions that are 
intended to treat GD by modifying primary and/or secondary sex 
characteristics.68 
The term “transgender” is an umbrella term that includes all 
individuals who cross or transcend culturally prescribed gender 
norms.69  The gender identity of transgender people differs in varying 
degrees from the sex they were assigned at birth, and consequently, 
the extent that transgender individuals may desire to acquire the 
physical characteristics of another sex may vary as well.70  However, 
requiring or desiring gender-affirming treatment is not determinative 
of being transgender.  Given the broad framing of the term, 
transgender individuals may also not seek to acquire the physical 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id.; Eli Coleman et al., World, Prof’l Ass’n for Transgender Health, Standards 
of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender-Nonconforming 
People, Version 7, 13 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 165, 168 (2011). 
 66. See infra Section I.B. 
 67. Levasseur, supra note 22, at 956–57; see also Brynn Tannenhill, Myths About 
Gender Affirmation Surgery, 102 POLARE 25, 27 (2015) 
http://www.gendercentre.org.au/documents/polare/Polare-102.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G6SE-XGAH]. 
 68. Surgical procedures may include breast or chest surgeries such as 
augmentation mammoplasty or subcutaneous mastectomy; genital surgeries such as 
penectomy, orchiectomy, vaginoplasty, clitoroplasty, vulvoplasty, 
hysterectomy/salpingo-oophorectomy, urethra reconstruction, possibly combined 
with a metoidioplasy or with a phalloplasty, vaginectomy, scrotoplasty, and 
implantation of erection and/or testicular prosthese; facial feminization surgery, 
liposuction, lipofilling, voice surgery, thyroid cartilage reduction, gluteal 
augmentation (implants/lipofilling), hair reconstruction, pectoral implants, and 
various procedures that facilitate a person being perceived as the gender with which 
they identify. WPATH, supra note 23, at 57. 
 69. Id. at 97. 
 70. Id.; Jack Drescher, From Bisexuality to Intersexuality: Rethinking Gender 
Categories, 43 CONTEMP. PSYCHOANALYSIS 204, 208 (2007). 
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characteristics of another sex, or might not experience GD.71  As the 
World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) 
standards note, “[o]nly some gender-nonconforming people 
experience gender dysphoria at some point in their lives.”72  Thus, the 
term transgender should be construed broadly to include individuals 
who seek access to gender-affirming healthcare and gender non-
conforming individuals who do not. 
B. Diagnosis and Treatment of Adolescent Gender Dysphoria  
This section explores the medical community’s acceptance of GD 
as a clinical condition that requires treatment and the development of 
appropriate health protocols to treat it.  In addition to recognizing the 
occurrence of GD among adults, the medical community also 
recognizes that children and adolescents may experience GD.  
Indeed, health professionals and psychologists who have studied GD 
have developed diagnostic criteria for adolescent GD and have 
outlined the best methods and practices for treatment. 
1. Diagnosis of Adolescent Gender Dysphoria 
The DSM-V classifies GD as “the distress that may accompany the 
incongruence between one’s experienced or expressed gender and 
one’s assigned gender.”73  The DSM-V has two separate diagnostic 
criteria for gender dysphoria in children74 and gender dysphoria in 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Adams, supra note 37, at 179 (noting that using a desire for gender affirming 
surgery as a determinative factor for identifying an individual as transgender ignores 
that individual’s dignity). 
 72. WPATH, supra note 23, at 5 (emphasis added). 
 73. DSM-V, supra note 17, at 451. 
 74. Id. at 452.  For children, the DSM-V requires six of the following 
manifestations: 
1.  A strong desire to be of the other gender or an insistence 
that one is the other gender (or some alternative gender different 
from one’s assigned gender). 
2.  In boys (assigned gender), a strong preference for cross-
dressing or simulating female attire; or in girls (assigned gender), a 
strong preference for wearing only typical masculine clothing and a 
strong resistance to the wearing of typical feminine clothing. 
3. A strong preference for cross-gender roles in make-believe play 
or fantasy play. 
4. A strong preference for the toys, games, or activities 
stereotypically used or engaged in by the other gender. 
5.  A strong preference for playmates of the other gender. 
6. In boys (assigned gender), a strong rejection of typically 
masculine toys, games, and activities and a strong avoidance of 
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adolescents and adults.75  Under both criteria, diagnosis is based upon 
manifestations of (1) incongruence between an individual’s gender 
expression and their sex assigned at birth, and “(2) clinically 
significant distress or impairment in social, school, or other important 
areas of functioning.”76  For adolescents and adults, the DSM-V 
requires that the incongruence be manifested by at least two of the 
following:77 
1. A marked incongruence between one’s 
experienced/expressed gender and primary and/or 
secondary sex characteristics (or in young adolescents, 
the anticipated secondary sex characteristics). 
2. A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary 
and/or secondary sex characteristics because of a 
marked incongruence with one’s 
experienced/expressed gender (or in young 
adolescents, a desire to prevent the development of 
the anticipated secondary sex characteristics). 
3. A strong desire for the primary and/or 
secondary sex characteristics of the other gender. 
4. A strong desire to be of the other gender (or 
some alternative gender different from one’s assigned 
gender). 
5. A strong desire to be treated as the other 
gender (or some alternative gender different from 
one’s assigned gender). 
6. A strong conviction that one has the typical 
feelings and reactions of the other gender (or some 
alternative gender different form one’s assigned 
gender).78 
                                                                                                                 
rough-and-tumble play; or in girls (assigned gender), a strong 
rejection of typically feminine toys, games, and activities. 
7. A strong dislike for one’s sexual anatomy. 
8. A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex 
characteristics that match one’s experienced gender. 
Id. 
 75. Id at 452-53. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 452. 
 78. Id.  Critics of the DSM-V’s definition have argued that the criteria emphasize 
an expectation for individuals to conform with gender and heterosexual norms that 
harkens back to an era in which homosexuality was pathologized.  It is worth noting 
that the APA first added the diagnostic criteria for GD to the DSM-V in the same 
year that homosexuality was removed.  Some scholars argue that these changes were 
based on the then-emerging gay and lesbian rights movement, which made inclusion 
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Mental health experts have also recognized treatment protocols 
and standards for diagnosing and treating GD.79  One such source of 
protocols and standards is WPATH, an international association of 
multidisciplinary professionals with a mission towards producing 
evidence-based education, advocacy, and policy surrounding 
transgender health.80  The association was founded by Harry 
Benjamin, whose seminal work, The Transsexual Phenomenon, 
brought wide attention to transgender identities and the notion that 
individuals should live according to their preferred gender.81  
Benjamin eventually founded WPATH and oversaw the development 
of the WPATH Standards of Care, a treatment protocol that provides 
guidance to health professionals to assist transgender and gender-
nonconforming individuals.82  The Standards of Care, now in its 
seventh edition, are used by professionals in the field of transgender 
health, have been accepted by the AMA,83 and have been 
acknowledged by federal courts as being generally accepted in the 
medical field.84 
                                                                                                                 
of homosexuality in the DSM-V unacceptable, but it did not disturb the association of 
gender-variant behavior with homosexuality.  Mental health professionals have since 
sought to acknowledge the role that varying cultural attitudes towards gender play in 
defining gender identities while still understanding the occurrence of GD amongst 
adolescents. See Shield, supra note 31, at 387–88; Ian Wilson et al., The Validity of 
the Diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder (Child and Adolescent Criteria), 7 
CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 335, 339 (2002). 
 79. WPATH, supra note 23, at 1–2 (noting the purpose of the Standards of Care is 
to offer “standards for promoting optimal care and guiding the treatment of people 
experiencing gender dysphoria” and that it is based upon “the best available science 
and expert professional consensus”). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Wilson et al., supra note 78, at 337–38. 
 82. WPATH, supra note 23, at 2. 
 83. AMA RESOLUTION 122, supra note 19, at 1 (“The [WPATH] is the leading 
international interdisciplinary professional organization devoted to the 
understanding and treatment of gender identity disorders, and [it] has established 
internationally accepted Standards of Care for providing medical treatment for 
people with [GD].”). 
 84. See, e.g., NCD 140.3, Transsexual Surgery, Docket No. 2576, at 20–23 (Dep’t 
of Health & Human Serv. May 30, 2014) [hereinafter H.H.S. Medicare Decision] 
(citing De’Lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522–23 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that the 
SOC “are the generally accepted protocols for the treatment of [GD]”), 
http://www.hhs.gov/dab/decisions/dabdecisions/dab2576.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6JX-
TQF5] and Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1289 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (noting 
that “there is sufficient evidence that statements of WPATH are accepted in the 
medical community”)). 
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2. Occurrence of Gender Dysphoria Among Children and 
Adolescents 
It is generally accepted within the medical community that children 
may experience GD.85  Eminent psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg 
suggests that children develop an understanding of their gender 
identity between the ages of five and seven when they realize that 
they will not be able to change their physiological characteristics.86  
More recent studies show that the average age at which transgender 
participants “felt different from others” was seven and a half years 
old.87  Other studies indicate that individuals become aware of their 
“gender difference” at any age before fourteen.88  Collectively, these 
studies suggest that most transgender individuals are aware of their 
gender nonconformity during adolescence.89 
While the medical community recognizes that children may 
experience GD, most professionals suggest that treatment is better 
suited for adolescents.90  Both the DSM-V and the WPATH standards 
note that children as young as two years old may show indications of 
GD,91 but that persistence of GD into adolescence and adulthood is 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 10; see also DSM-V, supra note 17, at 452 (providing diagnostic criteria 
for GD in children). 
 86. BEEMYN & RANKIN, supra note 36, at 42 (citing Lawrence Kohlberg, A 
Cognitive Developmental Analysis of Children’s Sex Role Concepts and Attitudes, in 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEX DIFFERENCES 88–173 (E.E. Maccoby ed., 1966)). 
 87. Arnold H. Grossman et al., Parents’ Reactions to Transgender Youths’ 
Gender Nonconforming Expression and Identity, 18 J. GAY & LESBIAN SOC. SERVS. 
3, 5 (2005) (finding that fifty-five FTM and MTF transgender youths felt “different 
from others” at a mean age of 7.5). 
 88. BEEMYN & RANKIN, supra note 36, at 42 (discussing one study in which 
respondents stated that their earliest memories of being transgender were from their 
earliest memories to age fourteen, with a median age of five years old). 
 89. Id. at 43 (finding one study where ninety-seven percent of the 3747 
respondents indicated that they “recognized themselves as being different from 
others or their assigned gender by the end of the[ir] teenage years”). 
 90. AMA RESOLUTION 122, supra note 19; see WPATH, supra note 23, at 12 
(noting that “in most children, gender dysphoria will disappear before, or early in, 
puberty”); see also Bernadette Wren, Early Physical Intervention for Young People 
with Atypical Gender Identity Development, 5 CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. & 
PSYCHIATRY 220, 222–23 (2000) (noting that “research and clinical descriptions” 
make clear that adolescents experiencing GD invariably seek gender affirming 
surgery later in life, while children who experience GD do so at lower levels or not at 
all). 
 91. WPATH, supra note 23, at 12; DSM-V, supra note 17, at 455.  While the 
diagnostic criteria has been criticized for focusing too heavily on the child’s gender 
expression as opposed to their own intrinsic sense of gender identity, such criticisms 
do not question the phenomenology of gender dysphoria within children. 
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not inevitable.92  The WPATH standards note, however, that some 
children experiencing feelings of GD will find that these “feelings will 
intensify and the body aversion will develop or increase as they 
become adolescents and their secondary sex characteristics 
develop.”93  While it is uncertain whether a particular child with GD 
will continue to experience GD as he or she transitions into 
adolescence, research indicates that an adolescent who experiences 
GD is likely to continue experiencing feelings of gender dysphoria 
into adulthood.94  In fact, one study found that all of its participants 
who were diagnosed with adolescent GD and given puberty-
suppressing hormones95 continued with gender-affirming treatment as 
they transitioned into adulthood, which is strong evidence that their 
feelings of GD did not disappear as they aged.96 
3. Treatment of Gender Dysphoria Among Adolescents 
The WPATH Standards of Care outline proper treatment for GD 
that could include psychological interventions, social interventions, 
and physical interventions.97  This “triadic therapy” approach has 
been embraced by psychologists.98  Psychological interventions consist 
of psychotherapy that is focused on reducing the distress related to 
GD.99  Social interventions consist of the individual taking on the 
cultural role of the desired gender identity so that they may 
appreciate the familial, interpersonal, and legal consequences of 
                                                                                                                 
 92. DSM-V, supra note 17, at 455 (stating that persistence in natal males has 
ranged from 2.2% to 30% and 12% to 50% in natal females). 
 93. WPATH, supra note 23, at 12. 
 94. Id.; Annelou L.C. de Vries et al., Puberty Suppression in Adolescents with 
Gender Identity Disorder: A Prospective Follow-Up Study, 8 J. SEXUAL MED. 2276, 
2281 (2010). 
 95. Puberty-suppressing hormones delay the onset of puberty, giving children and 
adolescents who experience gender dysphoria some time to further discover their 
gender identity. Kristian Foden-Vencil, Puberty Suppression Now a Choice for Teens 
On Medicaid in Oregon, NPR (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2015/04/05/397275700/puberty-suppression-now-choice-for-teens-on-medicaid-
in-oregon; see also Kristian Foden-Vencil, The Medical Pros and Cons of 
Suppressing Puberty in Transgender Teens, OR. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 25, 2015), 
http://www.opb.org/news/article/the-medical-pros-and-cons-of-suppressing-puberty-
in-transgender-teens [https://perma.cc/R3E4-8T5E] [hereinafter Foden-Vencil, 
Medical Pros and Cons].  The hormones have been prescribed and approved for 
precocious puberty, but are now covered under Oregon’s state Medicaid program for 
treatment of GD. Id. 
 96. Foden-Vencil, Medical Pros and Cons, supra note 95. 
 97. WPATH, supra note 23, at 15. 
 98. COHEN-KETTENIS & PFÄFFLIN , supra note 47, at 132. 
 99. WPATH, supra note 23, at 15. 
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gender transition.100  Examples of social interventions might include 
wearing clothes or a hairstyle that reflects the adolescent’s gender 
identity or using a name and pronouns that are congruent with the 
adolescent’s gender identity.101  Physical interventions, which the 
WPATH suggests should be pursued only after an individual has 
engaged in the psychological and social interventions,102 consist of 
estrogen or testosterone suppressants, as well as surgical 
procedures.103  The WPATH approach relies on the individual to 
determine his or her own gender identity, rather than framing 
treatment within a gender binary.104 
C. Medicaid Coverage of Gender-Affirming Healthcare 
Medicaid is a joint federal and state program that helps individuals 
with low income or low resources pay for health services and medical 
treatments.105  Although states receive federal funding for Medicaid, 
states’ governments establish and define the scope of their Medicaid 
programs.106  Because gender-affirming healthcare is costly, 
individuals seeking to transition often cannot afford to pay for 
treatment on their own,107 and only a few state Medicaid programs 
provide coverage for gender-affirming healthcare.108  States that do 
not expressly cover gender-affirming treatments either expressly deny 
Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming healthcare or deny coverage 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at 17; COHEN-KETTENIS & PFÄFFLIN, supra note 47, at 141. 
 101. WPATH, supra note 23, at 16. 
 102. WPATH’s Standards of Care have been criticized for this as it places the 
mental health practitioners in a determinative role that requires greater financial 
resources, and some view the WPATH standards as also placing psychology 
professionals as “gatekeepers” to medically necessary care. Sebastian, Transgender 
People, Transitioning, and Those Darn Standards of Care, AUTOSTRADDLE (Oct. 5, 
2011, 10:12 AM), http://www.autostraddle.com/transgender-people-and-those-darn-
standards-of-care-113430 [https://perma.cc/HDD8-2ZAN] (discussing the 6th edition 
of the WPATH standards). 
 103. WPATH, supra note 23, at 18. 
 104. Id. at 9. 
 105. Medicaid, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-
costs/help-paying-costs/medicaid/medicaid.html [https://perma.cc/9H4F-PHPZ]. 
 106. Nicole M. True, Removing the Constraints to Coverage of Gender-
Confirming Healthcare by State Medicaid Programs, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1329, 1343–44 
(2012). 
 107. Casazza, supra note 34, at 649–50; see also HORTON, supra note 32, at 4. 
 108. Casazza, supra note 34, at 642; see also Levasseur, supra note 22, at 957 (citing 
Trans Aging: We’re Still Here!, LAMBDA LEGAL (2016), 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/2016_trans-aging-fs-v6-single-
withbleed.pdf [https://perma.cc/J67G-QFYF] (noting that “most private and public 
insurance companies are still behind the times”). 
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on the grounds that it is not “medically necessary.”109  Some states 
that do extend coverage, such as New York and Vermont, restrict it 
on the basis of age.110 
1. Federal and Private Insurance Coverage of Gender-Affirming 
Healthcare 
Due to the high costs of gender-affirming healthcare, most 
individuals who seek to transition can only do so if the treatment is 
covered by private insurers or Medicaid.111  A 2001 study found that 
the average cost for male-to-female gender-affirming surgery and 
hormones was close to $20,000 over the course of three years.112  That 
same study found that the average cost of female-to-male gender-
affirming surgery and hormones was $16,512 over a three-year 
period.113  More recent reports vary, with some suggesting that the 
cumulative costs could be between $40,000 and $100,000.114  Gender-
affirming healthcare is thus likely to be cost-prohibitive if covered by 
an individual alone. 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Casazza, supra note 34, at 642 (noting that many states “specifically prohibit 
the use of funds for sex reassignment surgery,” and that federal courts have denied 
coverage of medically necessary sex reassignment surgery (SRS) “in instances when 
states fail to address whether SRS is covered or not”); see Rush v. Johnson, 565 F. 
Supp. 856, 868 (N.D. Ga., 1983) (finding Georgia reasonably determined that 
“transsexual surgery” is experimental); see also Smith v. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755, 
760 (8th Cir., 2001) (finding that Iowa’s exclusion of “sex reassignment surgery” from 
Medicaid coverage was not arbitrary and capricious). 
 110. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 505.2 (2016) (denying coverage 
for hormone therapy and gender affirming surgery for individuals under the age of 
eighteen and denying coverage for gender affirming surgery that results in 
sterilization for individuals under the age of twenty-one); Gender Reassignment 
Surgery, DEP’T OF VT. HEALTH ACCESS MED. POL’Y (Dep’t of Vt. Health Access, 
Williston, Vt.), July 14, 2015, http://dvha.vermont.gov/for-providers/1gender-
reassignment-surgery071415.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BYD-JPNU] (denying coverage 
for any gender-affirming healthcare to individuals under the age of twenty-one). 
 111. Casazza, supra note 34, at 649–50. 
 112. HORTON, supra note 32. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Transaction Costs, TRANSSEXUAL ROAD MAP, 
http://www.tsroadmap.com/reality/finance/fintrncost.html [https://perma.cc/2XPP-
BENH].  Additionally, it appears that genital surgery alone could cost around 
$20,000. Female to Male Price List, PHILA. CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER SURGERY, 
http://www.thetransgendercenter.com/index.php/femaletomale1/ftm-price-list.html 
[https://perma.cc/XEW5-Y33J]; Male to Female Price List, PHILA. CTR. FOR 
TRANSGENDER SURGERY, http://www.thetransgendercenter.com/index.php/mtf-price-
list.html [https://perma.cc/P25Q-27MR]; see Amanda Kennedy, Because We Say So: 
The Unfortunate Denial of Rights to Transgender Minors Regarding Transition, 19 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 284 (2008) (citing a Transgender Law Center report 
which finds that surgery may cost up to $100,000). 
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These costs present significant challenges to a large proportion of 
the transgender population, as many individuals cannot afford 
gender-affirming healthcare.  One reason for this is that transgender 
individuals are disproportionately subjected to employment 
discrimination and wage discrimination.115  In a 2011 study of 
transgender individuals, fifteen percent of respondents reported 
making $10,000 or less per year, a percentage nearly four times that of 
the general population.116  Transgender youth, in particular, are also 
less likely to have the means to meet the costs of gender-affirming 
healthcare, as they typically are dependent on a parent for access to 
healthcare coverage and because transgender youth are 
overrepresented among runaway and homeless youth.117 
In recent years, more employers have implemented health benefit 
plans that cover some form of gender-affirming healthcare.118  State 
and municipal legislatures have created incentives for insurance 
companies and businesses to cover gender-affirming healthcare.119  In 
New York, for instance, the Department of Financial Services issued 
a circular in 2014 clarifying that a denial of gender-affirming 
treatments, where that treatment is otherwise covered, would be a 
                                                                                                                 
 115. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL & CTR. 
FOR AM. PROGRESS, ALL CHILDREN MATTER: HOW LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
INEQUALITIES HURT LGBT FAMILIES 9 (2011), 
http://action.familyequality.org/site/DocServer/AllChildrenMatterFullFinal10212011.
pdf?docID=2401 [https://perma.cc/S7QW-38RY] (citing JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., 
NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2 (2011), 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XAP8-XCGD]). 
 116. Id. at 9. 
 117. ANDREW CRAY ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SEEKING SHELTER: THE 
EXPERIENCES AND UNMET NEEDS OF LGBT HOMELESS YOUTH 4, 8 (2013); LANCE 
FREEMAN & DARRICK HAMILTON, EMPIRE STATE COAL. OF YOUTH & FAMILY 
SERVS., A COUNT OF HOMELESS YOUTH IN NEW YORK CITY (2008). 
 118. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX: 
INCLUSIVE HEALTH CARE COVERAGE AND THE CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 3 
(2012) (finding a five-fold increase in the number of major U.S. employers affording 
transgender-inclusive health care coverage, from forty-nine in 2009 to more than two 
hundred in 2012). 
 119. See Insurance Circular Letter No. 7 from the New York State Dep’t of Fin. 
Servs., to All Insurers Authorized to Write Accident and Health Insurance in New 
York State, Article 43 Corporations, and Health Maintenance Organizations 
(“HMOs”) (collectively, “insurers”)   (Dec. 11, 2014), 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/circltr/2014/cl2014_07.pdf [https://perma.cc/D85Y-
32G5] (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 52.16(c) (2016)) (clarifying that 
a denial of medically necessary GD coverage would violate state law); Phila. City 
Council 130224 (Pa. 2013) (providing tax credits to employers who expand health 
benefits to cover transgender related healthcare). 
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violation of state regulations prohibiting companies from limiting 
coverage on the basis of illness, treatment, or medical condition.120  
Market forces may also have motivated insurers to cover gender-
affirming healthcare, as more employers are seeking this coverage.121 
Despite evidence of the medical necessity of gender-affirming 
healthcare for adults and adolescents with GD, government 
subsidized health insurance varies in its coverage.122  Medicare, which 
provides coverage for individuals over the age of sixty-five and is 
administered solely by the federal government’s Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), covers gender-affirming surgery 
for eligible Medicare recipients.123  By contrast, Tricare, the federal 
government’s healthcare program for members of the military and 
Department of Defense, expressly excludes coverage for all gender-
affirming healthcare.124  Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming 
healthcare varies by state, as each state determines the scope of its 
Medicaid program.125  Unlike Medicare and Tricare, Medicaid is 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Insurance Circular Letter No. 7 from the New York State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 
supra note 119 (citing (tit. 11, § 52.16(c)). 
 121. TRANSGENDER LAW CTR., TRANSGENDER HEALTH BENEFITS: NEGOTIATING 
FOR INCLUSIVE COVERAGE 14 (2014), http://transgenderlawcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/Health-Insurance-Exclusions-Guide-2-WEB.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X4YB-W2BB] (advising that employees show employers how their 
competitors may be gaining an advantage by offering trans-inclusive healthcare 
plans). 
 122. DSM-V, supra note 17, at 454; see also H.H.S. Medicare Decision, supra note 
84.  In its decision to extend Medicare coverage to gender-affirming healthcare, the 
Department of Health and Human Services found that there is “a consensus among 
researchers and mainstream medical organizations that transsexual surgery is an 
effective, safe, and medically necessary treatment for [gender dysphoria].” H.H.S. 
Medicare Decision, supra note 84.  The decision also cited new evidence which 
asserted that “gender affirming surgeries . . . are the standard of care and are not 
experimental.” Id. 
 123. See H.H.S. Medicare Decision, supra note 84, at 1 (“The Board has 
determined that the National Coverage Determination (NCD) denying Medicare 
coverage of all transsexual surgery as a treatment for transsexualism is not valid 
under the ‘reasonableness standard’ the Board applies.”). 
 124. 32 C.F.R. § 199.4 (2015) (“All services and supplies directly or indirectly 
related to transsexualism or such other conditions as gender dysphoria are excluded 
under [Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniform Services] 
[(]CHAMPUS[)].”).  Note, it is odd that the federal government finds that gender 
affirming surgery and hormone treatments are medically necessary when one is sixty-
five or older, but not when one is young and has served or is serving in the military. 
 125. Casazza, supra note 34, at 642; Transgender Health Care, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/transgender-health-care/ [https://perma.cc/6ZZP-7E2V] 
(“Many health plans are still using exclusions such as ‘services related to sex change’ 
or ‘sex reassignment surgery’ to deny coverage to transgender people for certain 
health care services.  Coverage varies by state.”). 
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administered jointly by the federal government and states.126  States 
determine the coverage of their Medicaid programs, but only receive 
federal funding if they meet federal regulations.127  Thus, states have 
taken three different approaches to include or exclude gender-
affirming healthcare from Medicaid coverage. 
2. Three Approaches to Medicaid Coverage of Gender-Affirming 
Healthcare 
In regulating the coverage of their Medicaid plans, states fall into 
one of three distinct groups.  First, a minority of states have 
promulgated regulations that expressly exclude Medicaid coverage of 
gender-affirming healthcare or gender-affirming surgery.128  The 
language of these statutes varies in breadth: some arguably only limit 
the exclusion to gender-affirming surgical procedures,129 while others 
use broader language that clearly excludes all forms of gender-
affirming healthcare.130  Second, a majority of states do not have 
regulations that expressly deny coverage for gender-affirming 
healthcare or gender-affirmation surgery, but nonetheless, they have 
a practice of not extending coverage on the grounds that the 
treatments are not “medically necessary.”131  These states have 
prevailed in federal court against challenges seeking coverage, as the 
                                                                                                                 
 126. “Medicaid offers the States a bargain: Congress provides federal funds in 
exchange for the States’ agreement to spend them in accordance with congressionally 
imposed conditions.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1382 
(2015). 
 127. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2015). 
 128. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.0625 (West 2016); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. 
tit. 22, §10-2.060 (2010); 471 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 18-003.01 (2010); 55 PA. CODE § 
1163.59 (2016). 
 129. See, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-78.1(249A) (2016) (prohibiting coverage 
of “[c]osmetic, reconstructive, or plastic surgery performed in connection with certain 
conditions is specifically excluded.  These conditions are . . . [p]rocedures related to 
transsexualism, hermaphroditism, gender identity disorders, or body dysmorphic 
disorders.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.0625 (West 2016) (“Sex reassignment surgery 
is not covered.”); 471 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 18-003.0l (2010) (“[Nebraska Medical 
Assistance Program] [(]NMAP[)] does not cover . . . sex change procedures); 55 PA. 
CODE § 1163.59 (2016) (excluding coverage of all “[t]ranssexual surgical procedures 
for gender change or reassignment). 
 130. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 22, §10-2.060 (2010) (excluding “[g]ender 
reassignment services and associated expenses of transformation operations, 
regardless of any diagnosis of gender role disorientation or psychosexual orientation 
or any treatment or studies related to gender reassignment; also, hormonal support 
for gender reassignment”). 
 131. See Casazza, supra note 34, at 642; see, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-
78.1(249A) (2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.0625 (West 2016); 55 PA. CODE § 
1163.59 (2016). 
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Supreme Court has given states broad discretion in determining what 
constitutes a medical necessity.132  Third, a growing minority of states 
is adopting regulations that expressly extend Medicaid coverage for 
gender-affirming healthcare.133  Among these states is New York, 
which repealed its blanket exclusion of gender-affirming healthcare in 
2014.134  While each state may have particular requirements for 
individuals to meet in order to be eligible for coverage, the New York 
regulation contains a few provisions that distinguish it from other 
states. 
3. New York’s Medicaid Coverage of Gender-Affirming 
Healthcare 
Before 2014, New York statutorily excluded all gender-affirming 
healthcare from Medicaid coverage.135  Section 505.2 of title 18 of the 
New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (NYCRR) sets forth the 
physicians’ services the New York State Medicaid program covers.136  
When section 505.2 was promulgated in 1998, it denied coverage for 
all care, services, drugs, or supplies rendered for the purpose of 
gender reassignment or any care, services, drugs, or supplies intended 
to promote such treatment.137  In December 2014, however, the New 
York State Department of Health proposed an amendment to the 
regulation that would authorize Medicaid coverage for gender-
affirming healthcare.138  The amendment was the result of a twelve-
year campaign139 by transgender-rights advocates that included the 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977). 
 133. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 505.2 (2016); see also Gender 
Reassignment Surgery, supra note 110; HEALTH EVIDENCE REV. COMM’N AUG. 14, 
2014 MEETING MINUTES, at 7 (Or. 2014), 
http://www.oregon.gov/oha/herc/CommitteeMeetingMaterials/HERC%20Minutes%
208-14-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3NJ-M2KH]. 
 134. tit. 18, § 505.2(l). 
 135. Transgender Related Care and Services, 2014 N.Y. Reg. 2 (Dec. 17, 2014) 
(codified at tit. 18, § 505.2(l)) (“Section 505.2(l) of 18 NYCRR, related to Medicaid 
payment for physicians’ services, currently prohibits payment for any care, services, 
drugs, or supplies rendered in connection with GRS.”). 
 136. tit. 18, § 505.2(l). 
 137. Transgender Related Care and Services, 2014 N.Y. Reg. 2; see N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 505.2(l). 
 138. Transgender Related Care and Services, 2014 N.Y. Reg. 2. 
 139. In 2008, New York Legal Assistance Group, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, 
and the Sylvia Rivera Project filed a § 1983 claim on behalf of Teri Casillas, a 
transgender woman from the Bronx, that challenged New York’s Medicaid program 
on the grounds that it violated the 14th Amendment. Casillas v. Daines, 580 F. Supp. 
2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2015).  Following the court’s decision 
to uphold the regulation, the Sylvia Rivera Project lobbied the Governor’s office and 
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filing of Cruz v. Zucker, a class action suit brought by the Sylvia 
Rivera Project, the Legal Aid Society, and Wilkie Farr & Gallagher 
LLP against the Department of Health.140  In Cruz, the two named 
plaintiffs—transgender Medicaid recipients who were residents of 
New York City—argued that the state’s Medicaid program violated 
three requirements of the federal Medicaid Act, the New York State 
Constitution, and the Affordable Care Act.141  The claim was brought 
against the Commissioner of the New York State Department of 
Health, Howard Zucker, and was settled with one of the named 
plaintiffs shortly before the Department of Health announced it 
would amend section 505.2 of the State’s Medicaid regulation.142  The 
express purpose of the amended version of section 505.2 was “to 
authorize Medicaid coverage for transgender related care and 
services,” and indeed, the amendment explicitly extended coverage 
for medically necessary hormone therapy and gender-affirming 
surgery for the treatment of gender dysphoria.143 
4. New York’s Age-Based Limitations of Medicaid Coverage for 
Gender-Affirming Care 
While advocates lauded the proposed amendments to section 
505.2, organizations like the Transgender Legal Defense and 
Education Fund (TLDEF) also noted that it fell short.144  During the 
notice and comment period, advocates criticized section 505.2’s age-
                                                                                                                 
began media campaigning in conjunction with GLAAD. End Healthcare 
Discrimination for Transgender People, GLAAD, http://www.glaad.org/healthcare 
[https://perma.cc/48QH-33UH].  In June of 2014, the Sylvia Rivera Project worked 
with the Legal Aid Society of New York and Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher to file Cruz v. 
Zucker.  Elana Redfield, Medicaid Programs Will Now Cover Transgender 
Healthcare Following SLRP’s Twelve-Year Campaign, SYLVIA RIVERA L. PROJECT 
(Dec. 17, 2014), http://srlp.org/medicaid-programs-will-now-cover-transgender-
healthcare-following-srlps-twelve-year-campaign [https://perma.cc/989S-B7W4]. 
 140. Complaint at 1, Cruz v. Zucker, 116 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 14 
CV 4456), 2014 WL 2872300); see also Redfield, supra note 139. 
 141. Complaint, supra note 140, at 2. 
 142. Stipulation & Order, Cruz, 116 F. Supp. 3d 334 (No. 14 CV 4456). 
 143. Transgender Related Care and Services, 2014 N.Y. Reg. 2. 
 144. TLDEF’s executive director stated: “While this new regulation will 
dramatically improve the lives of many transgender New Yorkers by ensuring that 
they receive the medically necessary care that they need, it does not address all of the 
medically necessary health care needs that transgender people have.  And it 
continues to exclude transgender youth.  We look forward to working with the 
administration in the coming weeks to remedy this.” Press Release, Transgender 
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, New York State Acts to Remove Medicaid Ban on 
Transgender Health Care (Dec. 16, 2014), 
http://www.transgenderlegal.org/headline_show.php?id=554New 
[https://perma.cc/29RJ-BBTE]. 
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based restriction of coverage, its referral requirements for certain 
procedures, and its exclusion of “cosmetic procedures.”145  Despite 
this criticism, the state nonetheless kept these provisions in place.146 
New York’s procedure-based exclusion is similar to those in other 
states, such as Vermont, where procedures that are categorized as 
cosmetic are excluded from coverage.147  These kinds of exclusions 
have been criticized for denying coverage that many medical and 
psychological experts could designate as medically necessary, 
including, for instance, breast augmentation or reduction 
procedures.148  While New York’s Medicaid program covers the cost 
of breast reduction, it excludes coverage for breast augmentation.149  
All of these procedures may be merely cosmetic in other contexts; 
however, they are often identified as medically necessary for 
transgender individuals.150  The WPATH further notes that in the 
context of gender-affirming surgeries, procedures that might typically 
have little therapeutic value to someone without GD—such as a 
rhinoplasty—may have a radical and permanent effect on the quality 
of life for someone experiencing GD.151 
New York and other states adopt a list of requirements that 
transgender individuals seeking gender-affirming surgery must meet 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Letter from Ethan Boehme Rice, Staff Att’y, Transgender Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, to Katherine Cerolao, Bureau of House Counsel, N.Y. Dep’t of Health (Feb. 2, 
2015) [hereinafter TLDEF Comments], 
http://www.transgenderlegal.org/media/uploads/doc_608.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RDU-
E5HD] (“Many of these procedures can be medically necessary for the treatment of 
gender dysphoria.  The Proposed Rule should be clarified to ensure that coverage is 
available for all medically necessary care for the treatment of gender dysphoria.”). 
 146. Transgender Related Care and Services, 2015 N.Y. Reg. 13–15 (Feb. 24, 2015); 
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 505.2(l) (2016). 
 147. Gender Reassignment Surgery, supra note 110 (excluding coverage of facial 
feminization surgery, jaw shortening/sculpting/facial bone reduction or other head or 
neck reconstruction, blepharoplasty, rhinoplasty, lip reduction/enhancement, 
face/forehead lift, chin/nose transplants, trachea shave/reduction thyroid 
chondroplasty, laryngoplasty, electrolysis, hair removal, liposuction, collagen 
injections, removal of redundant skin, hair transplantation, voice modification 
surgery.). 
 148. TLDEF Comments, supra note 145 (“Certain procedures that are designated 
‘cosmetic’ interventions can have a profound beneficial effect in treating gender 
dysphoria and are medically necessary in such cases.  For example, Subsection 
(4)(v)(b) excludes coverage for ‘breast augmentation.’  However, the [WPATH] 
Standards of Care include breast augmentation (implants, lipofilling) as medically 
necessary treatment for some patients with gender dysphoria.”). 
 149. Mastectomies or breast reduction surgery is absent from the list of excluded 
procedures. tit. 18, § 505.2(l). 
 150. WPATH, supra note 23, at 58. 
 151. Id. at 58. 
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to be reimbursed for gender-affirming surgery.152  Specifically, a 
patient must: (1) have referrals from two independent physicians, (2) 
have “a well-documented case of gender dysphoria,” (3) have taken 
hormones for a minimum of twelve months, (4) have lived in the 
congruent gender role for at least twelve months and received 
medically necessary health counseling during that time,153 (5) have 
“no other . . . medical . . . conditions that would be a contraindication 
of gender-affirmation surgery”, and (6) have “the capacity to make a 
fully informed decision and to consent to the treatment.”154  Thus, the 
regulation requires that an individual provide evidence that gender-
affirming surgery is a medical necessity. 
The most problematic requirement imposed by section 505.2 is its 
limitation of coverage for hormone therapy and gender-affirming 
surgery on the basis of age.155  Section 505.2 limits coverage for 
gender-affirming surgery that results in sterilization to patients who 
are twenty-one or older.156  Further, the regulation limits coverage for 
hormone therapy and gender-affirming surgery that does not result in 
sterilization to patients who are eighteen or older.157  At least one 
other state, Vermont, has implemented a similar age restriction in 
their Medicaid program that excludes coverage for individuals under 
the age of twenty-one.158  New York diverges from a number of states 
in this regard, as many states have extended Medicaid coverage 
without age-based restrictions.159  In Oregon, for example, treatment 
                                                                                                                 
 152. tit. 18, § 505.2(l). 
 153. This requirement bears similarities to the WPATH Standards of Care that 
recommend mental health professionals help clients and their families decide about 
the timing and extent to which adolescents express a gender role that is consistent 
with their gender identity. WPATH, supra note 23, at 21.  For example, a mental 
health professional should help a client decide when they might wear clothing or a 
hairstyle that reflects their gender identity or when to adopt a name and pronouns 
that reflects their gender identity. Id. 
 154. tit. 18, § 505.2(a). 
 155. Transgender Related Care and Services, 2015 N.Y. Reg. 13–15 (Feb. 24, 2015) 
(“The majority of commenters objected to the proposed regulation restricting 
coverage to individuals 18 years of age or older. Specifically, commenters 
recommended that Medicaid cover pubertal suppressants and cross-sex hormone 
therapy for children and adolescents under the age of 18.”); See tit. 18, § 505.2(l).  
 156. tit. 18, § 505.2(l) (“Hormone therapy . . . may be covered for individuals 18 
years of age or older. Gender reassignment surgery may be covered for an individual 
who is 18 years of age or older, or 21 years of age or older if the surgery will result in 
sterilization.”). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Gender Reassignment Surgery, supra note 110 (“The services will only be 
considered for individuals who are active Vermont Medicaid beneficiaries, age 21 or 
older.”). 
 159. OR. ADMIN. R. 410-141-0480 (2016). 
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for gender dysphoria—psychotherapy, hormone treatment, and 
gender-affirming surgery—is covered for all eligible patients, 
regardless of age.160 
As advocates have begun to disrupt the gender binary and 
traditional notions of gender identity, states have struggled to 
reconcile this development with their Medicaid programs.  Gender-
affirming healthcare seeks to address GD, the anxiety that results 
from a discrepancy between one’s gender identity and assigned sex at 
birth.161  States differ in their Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming 
healthcare to the extent to which they recognize it as medically 
necessary.162  New York’s Medicaid program recognizes the medical 
necessity of gender-affirming healthcare for adults, but does not do so 
for trans youth.163  Putting aside whether this varied coverage reflects 
the state’s reluctance to acknowledge trans youth and notions of 
gender nonconformity generally, the age-based restrictions in section 
505.2 may be at odds with the public health, legal, and policy goals of 
the state.164 
II.  CONFLICTS IN DOCTRINE AND LAW THAT MAY 
ARISE FROM MEDICAID AGE RESTRICTIONS ON 
GENDER-AFFIRMING HEALTHCARE 
Age-based restrictions on Medicaid coverage for gender-affirming 
treatment find support and criticism from a number of sources.  This 
Part discusses the areas of dispute that provide support and 
opposition to section 505.2 of New York’s Medicaid program.  
Section II.A describes the debate within the medical community as to 
whether gender-affirming treatment is medically necessary for 
individuals under the age of eighteen and the difficulties that the 
medical community has faced in determining how to treat GD during 
adolescence.  Section II.B describes how the doctrine of informed 
consent might support age-based restrictions on Medicaid coverage 
for gender-affirming treatment on the grounds that it presumes 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Oregon’s medical assistance program regulation provides coverage for 
treatments included on the prioritized list of services provided by the State’s Health 
Evidence Review Commission (HERC). See id.  In August 2014, HERC approved 
hormone treatment and sex reassignment surgery for the prioritized list of services 
without any age restrictions. OR. HEALTH AUTH., PRIORITIZED LIST: GUIDELINE FOR 
GENDER DYSPHORIA (2015), http://www.oregon.gov/oha/herc/FactSheet/Gender-
dysphoria.pdf [https://perma.cc/236F-NN2R]. 
 161. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 162. See discussion supra Section I.C. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See infra Parts II, III. 
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adolescents do not have the capacity to make informed decisions 
about their health.  In contrast, Section II.B also examines how the 
statutory definitions and exceptions to the doctrine of informed 
consent allow for minors to make informed health decisions and, 
therefore, undermine a bright-line age-restriction.  Section II.C 
examines the different legal claims that may result from the age-based 
restrictions and whether they justify removing the age-based 
restriction on coverage. 
A. The Medical Community’s View as to the Medical Necessity 
of Gender-Affirming Treatment for Individuals Under the Age of 
Eighteen 
Dispute amongst the medical community regarding the diagnosis of 
childhood GD may support the implementation of an age-based 
restriction on Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming treatment.  
While the DSM-V, WPATH, and APA recognize that it is possible 
for children to experience GD, research suggests that treating 
children under the age of twelve for GD may be unnecessary.165  The 
WPATH Standards of Care note that some children may stop 
experiencing GD when they begin puberty and do not affirmatively 
recommend physical interventions for children.166  The APA also 
notes that it is not possible to differentiate between children who will 
cease to experience GD from those in whom GD will persist into 
adolescence and adulthood.167  Further complicating the treatment of 
GD during childhood is the lack of randomized controlled studies 
which might otherwise allow for a clear consensus to develop on the 
best methods of treating children who are experiencing GD.168  Thus, 
                                                                                                                 
 165. The DSM-V recognizes the occurrence of GD amongst children and 
adolescents and specifically provides diagnostic criteria for assessing GD in children. 
DSM-V, supra note 17, at 452.  WPATH notes that “[c]hildren as young as two may 
show features that could indicate gender dysphoria.” WPATH, supra note 23, at 12; 
see also AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON 
TREATMENT OF GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER (2011) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE 
APA TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER]. 
 166. WPATH, supra note 23, at 12; see also Peggy Cohen-Kettenis et al., Sex 
Reassignment of Adolescent Transsexuals: A Follow Up Study, 36 J. AM. ACAD. 
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 263, 263 (1997) (“Prospective studies have 
shown that children with gender identity disorder will not grow up to be transsexuals.  
In a few, however, the cross-gender feelings will remain.  These individuals become 
adolescents who will attend gender identity clinics to obtain sex reassignment surgery 
(SRS).”). 
 167. See REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF GENDER IDENTITY 
DISORDER, supra note 165, at 4. 
 168. Id.  The APA has identified two general approaches to treating GD during 
childhood: one which encourages a child to explore their expressed gender identity, 
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proponents of the age-based restriction may argue that there is little 
support for providing Medicaid coverage for gender-affirming 
treatment for individuals under the age of twelve. 
Treating GD during adolescence also presents concerns that may 
support the implementation of an age-based restriction.  Adolescents 
may have concurring mental health conditions that may make it more 
difficult for a mental health expert to assess them.169  In addition, 
adolescents can become intensely focused on their immediate desires, 
which may make it difficult to assess whether they are cognitively and 
emotionally capable of making the decision to pursue gender-
affirming treatment.170  As a result of these concerns, some health 
professionals are also reluctant to treat adolescent GD on the 
grounds that it may motivate an adolescent to seek unnecessary 
treatment.171 
Despite these concerns regarding the diagnosis and treatment of 
adolescent and childhood GD, the weight of support within the 
medical community supports gender-affirming treatment for 
adolescents who need it.172  The DSM-V has recognized the unique 
challenges in diagnosing childhood GD by adopting a separate 
                                                                                                                 
and another which encourages a child to adopt their assigned gender role and sex 
identity at birth. Id. at 17.  The latter is based on a view that it may be less desirable 
for a child to adopt a non-conforming gender identity because of the social stigma 
that is often attached to transgender and gender non-conforming individuals. Id.  
There is, however, growing public support for the former method. See generally Kate 
Snow, Congressman’s Transgender Granddaughter Makes Him Proud, MSNBC 
(Oct. 10, 2015, 8:17 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/congressman-mike-honda-
transgender-granddaughter-makes-him-proud [https://perma.cc/PT5V-RRCN]. 
 169. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE 
WITH TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 17 (2015), 
http://www.apa.org/practice/guidelines/transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJC2-
QTQP] [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE WITH 
TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE] (“Complicating their 
clinical presentation, many gender-questioning adolescents also present with co-
occurring psychological concerns, such as suicidal ideation, self-injurious behaviors, 
drug and alcohol use, and autism spectrum disorders.”). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Cohen-Kettenis et al., supra note 166, at 263 (“Professionals fear that 
experimenting with certain aspects of gender, such as gender role behavior, will lead 
adolescents to conclude that they have a gender identity problem and that they will as 
a result wrongly seek medical means of resolving their confusion.”). 
 172. See GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE WITH TRANSGENDER AND 
GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE, supra note 169, at 17 (noting “there is greater 
consensus that treatment approaches for adolescents affirm an adolescent’s gender 
identity”). 
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diagnostic criteria for childhood GD.173  The DSM-V diagnostic 
criteria of adolescent GD, however, is the same as the criteria for 
adult GD.174  In regard to treatment, the WPATH Standards of Care, 
which have been supported and accepted widely by mental health 
experts, includes separate treatment protocols for adolescent and 
childhood GD.175  Thus, there is support from the DSM-V and 
WPATH Standards to suggest that the diagnosis and treatment of 
adolescent GD may bear fewer concerns than treatment of childhood 
GD. 
The support for treating adolescent GD is based on studies that 
indicate that adolescents who experience GD throughout childhood 
are likely to experience those feelings into adulthood.176  Thus, unlike 
children, most adolescents will continue to experience GD without 
intervention.177  Additionally, adolescents beyond the age of twelve 
are more likely to have a firmer understanding of gender constancy,178 
and thus are more likely to experience persistent GD.179  The growing 
consensus surrounding treatment of GD during adolescence is also 
reflected in empirical research that shows an increasing number of 
adolescents are seeking treatment for gender dysphoria and are living 
in their desired gender role upon entering high school.180  Mental 
health experts thus note the need to address GD earlier and, 
                                                                                                                 
 173. The DSM-V recognizes the occurrence of GD amongst children and 
adolescents and specifically provides diagnostic criteria for assessing GD in children. 
DSM-V, supra note 17, at 452. 
 174. Id. 
 175. The WPATH Standards of Care have been generally accepted by the medical 
community and assert the medical necessity of gender-affirming healthcare for 
adolescents.  See H.H.S. Medicare Decision, supra note 84, at 22–23 (noting the 
acceptance of the WPATH Standards of Care); see also WPATH, supra note 23, at 
10. 
 176. GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE WITH TRANSGENDER AND 
GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE, supra note 169, at 175. 
 177. de Vries et al., supra note 94, at 2276 (2011) (“Gender dysphoria will remit in 
most prepubertal children with [GD] but not in most gender dysphoric 
adolescents.”). 
 178. Gender constancy is a term used in the field of cognitive development that 
refers to a child’s cognitive understanding that gender is an invariant part of the self. 
Before developing the capacity for concrete operational thought, children often 
conflate gender identity with surface expressions of gender identity.  Gender 
constancy is reached when the child has the capacity to self-label themselves as a 
particular gender with the understanding that engaging in certain activities (e.g. 
wearing boys’ clothes) will not change it. Kenneth Zucker et al., A Developmental, 
Biopsychosocial Model for the Treatment of Children with Gender Identity 
Disorder, 59 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 369, 377 (2012). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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specifically, the negative impact of delaying treatment until the 
individuals reach the age of eighteen or twenty-one.181 
One method of treatment which may work to dispel the criticism of 
treating GD during adolescence is the use of puberty suppressants.  
The suppressants, which suspend the development of unwanted 
secondary sex characteristics, may be a viable option for adolescents 
who are experiencing GD.182  The Endocrine Society has also 
developed guidelines for the use of these suppressants that allow 
patients to decide, after several years of treatment, whether to pursue 
further gender-affirming treatment or to develop the secondary sex 
characteristics of their assigned sex at birth.183  A 2010 follow-up study 
of seventy adolescents who began taking puberty suppressants 
between the ages of twelve and sixteen found that all participants 
continued to pursue gender-affirming treatment into adulthood and 
demonstrated a significant decrease in depression and emotional 
problems.184  More recently in 2014, a follow-up study of adolescents 
who began taking puberty suppressants found that those adolescents 
were generally satisfied with the results and had greater psychological 
functioning as a result.185  Thus, medical research may also support 
extending Medicaid coverage to gender-affirming treatments such as 
puberty suppressants to individuals under the age of eighteen. 
                                                                                                                 
 181. de Vries et al., supra note 94, at 2277 (“However, as secondary sex 
characteristics develop before the age of 16, waiting for medical interventions is 
highly upsetting for most younger adolescents.”); see also Cohen-Kettenis et al., 
supra note 166, at 263 (“Despite the early onset of the disorder, in most countries it is 
common practice not to start the actual SRS procedure earlier than 18 or even 21 
years of age.”); Yolanda L.S. Smith et al., Adolescents with Gender Identity Disorder 
Who Were Accepted or Rejected for Sex Reassignment Surgery: A Prospective 
Follow-Up Study, 40 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 472, 472 (2001) 
(“Despite the early onset of gender identity disorder (GID) in many transsexuals, 
and in spite of the fact that transsexuals apply for sex reassignment surgery (SRS) at 
increasingly younger ages, it is common practice not to start the actual sex 
reassignment (SR) procedure before the age of 18 or 21 years.”). 
 182. See GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE WITH TRANSGENDER AND 
GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE, supra note 169, at 17; see also REPORT OF THE 
APA TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER, supra note 165, 
at 6. 
 183. See REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF GENDER IDENTITY 
DISORDER, supra note 165, at 6. 
 184. de Vries et al., supra note 94, at 2276–77 (“Previous studies on the 
effectiveness of [gender affirming treatment], starting at with cross-sex hormone 
(CSH) treatment between the ages of 16 and 18, showed that the gender dysphoria 
had dissipated, 1 year or more after GR surgery and that psychological and social 
functioning of these young transsexuals was favorable.”). 
 185. See generally Annelou L.C. de Vries et al., Young Adult Psychological 
Outcome After Puberty Suppression and Gender Reassignment, 134 PEDIATRICS 6, 
11–12 (2014). 
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B. Age Restrictions on the Access to Gender-Affirming 
Healthcare May be Inconsistent with Principles of Informed 
Consent 
Conflicting rationales for and against an age-based restriction on 
Medicaid coverage for gender-affirming treatment may also be based 
on the doctrine of informed consent.  The doctrine of informed 
consent presumes that minors do not have the capacity to fully 
understand health decisions and, thus, cannot give informed consent 
to treatment.186  The doctrine may provide support for the age-based 
restrictions in section 505.2 on the grounds that adolescents would not 
be able to provide consent to undergo gender-affirming treatment.  
On the other hand, statutory definitions and exceptions to the 
doctrine of informed consent may suggest that a bright-line age 
restriction to coverage is inappropriate. 
1. Support for the Age-Based Restriction as a Mechanism to 
Enforce the Doctrine of Informed Consent 
The doctrine of informed consent generally limits the kinds of 
decisions minors can make without parental consent on the grounds 
that children and adolescents do not have the capacity to make fully 
informed decisions.187  The Supreme Court has consistently upheld 
the doctrine and distinguished adolescents from fully formed adults 
who have a greater capacity to make decisions.188  In Roper v. 
Simmons, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the 
imposition of the death penalty on offenders who are under the age of 
eighteen at the time of the offense.189  The Court reasoned that the 
death penalty is an unnecessary and inappropriate punishment for 
adolescent offenders because adolescents are more likely than adults 
to engage in reckless behavior and are not likely to consider the 
consequences of their actions.190  Justice Kennedy noted that research 
confirms “a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults . . . .  
These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Shield, supra note 31, at 393 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) 
(“Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of 
themselves.  They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if 
parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae.”)). 
 187. Id. at 393–94. 
 188. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–73 (2005); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 
622, 633, 635 & n.13 (1979). 
 189. Roper, 545 U.S. at 578. 
 190. Id. at 569–72. 
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and decisions.”191  Kennedy thus reasoned that the law should treat 
youth differently than adults because of a discrepancy in decision-
making capability.192 
The Court has similarly considered the limited decision-making 
capabilities of adolescents in the context of health decisions.193  In 
Bellotti v. Baird, the Court heard a challenge to a Massachusetts 
statute that required minors to obtain parental consent or 
authorization from a court before undergoing abortions.194  While the 
Court acknowledged the constitutional right of a pregnant minor to 
choose to terminate her pregnancy, it ultimately held that the 
vulnerability of children, their inability to make important decisions, 
and the state’s interest in protecting the parental role in child rearing 
justified limiting the scope of a child’s constitutional rights.195  Writing 
for the majority, Justice Powell concluded that because “immature 
minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take 
into account both the immediate and long-range consequences,”196 
states may validly “limit the freedom of children to choose for 
themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with 
potentially serious consequences.”197  The  Court thus balanced the 
doctrine of informed consent with an adolescent’s right to choose to 
terminate a pregnancy by upholding the Massachusetts requirement 
for parental consent on the condition that the state also allows 
adolescents to bypass the requirement when a court finds that the 
minor is mature enough to make a fully informed decision and that 
the decision is in her best interests.198 
The Court’s decisions in Bellotti and Roper may provide support 
for the age-based restriction in section 505.2.  The reasoning in Roper 
adopted the view of adolescents as being susceptible to reckless 
                                                                                                                 
 191. Id. at 569. 
 192. Shield, supra note 31, at 405. 
 193. See, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 639 (hearing a challenge regarding a state statute 
which required that adolescents receive parental consent prior to obtaining an 
abortion). 
 194. Id. at 625 (ruling on the constitutionality of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 
12S (West Supp. 1979), which provided in relevant part: “If the mother is less than 
eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent of both the mother and her 
parents [to an abortion to be performed on the mother] is required.  If one or both of 
the mother’s parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a 
judge of the superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems 
necessary.”)  
 195. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633. 
 196. Id. at 640. 
 197. Id. at 635. 
 198. Id. at 643–44. 
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decisions that are not made with due consideration.199  Likewise, the 
Court in Bellotti held that states are justified in protecting 
adolescents from poor decisions, even if that health decision is 
constitutionally protected.200  Thus, the age-based restriction on 
Medicaid coverage may work to protect adolescents from deciding 
they need gender-affirming treatment when they are less likely to 
fully consider the consequences of this decision. 
2. Age-Based Restrictions May Conflict with Exceptions to the 
Doctrine of Informed Consent 
While the doctrine of informed consent may support age-based 
restrictions on gender-affirming treatment, the statutory definitions of 
informed consent suggest that a blanket age-restriction is 
inappropriate.  Although most states set the age of informed consent 
at eighteen, statutory definitions also generally focus on the capacity 
of the individual to make decisions about his or her health.201  For 
instance, in New York, informed consent “means that the patient has 
to demonstrate the intellect to understand what is being proposed, to 
realize and assess the risks and benefits, and to voluntarily consent to 
or refuse the proposed major medical treatment.”202  On this basis, 
some states, such as Oregon, have set the age of consent below the 
age of eighteen, which authorizes adolescents to give informed 
consent when they are fifteen.203  Thus, the age-based restriction of 
section 505.2 may conflict with the doctrine of informed consent as it 
focuses solely on the age of the individual and not his or her actual 
ability to make informed decisions. 
                                                                                                                 
 199. Roper, 545 U.S. at 569; Alicia Ouellette, Body Modification and Adolescent 
Decision Making: Proceed with Caution, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 129, 138–39 
(2012) (discussing the Roper decision and its application to parental consent to body 
modification). 
 200. Shield, supra note 31, at 394. 
 201. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 710.1 (2016). 
 202. Id. 
 203. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.640(2) (2013) (“A minor 15 years of age or older may 
give consent to, without the consent of a parent or guardian of the minor 
to . . . [h]ospital care, medical or surgical diagnosis or treatment by a physician 
licensed by the Oregon Medical Board.”); see also 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.6-1 
(2012) (“Any person of the age of sixteen or over or married may consent to routine 
emergency medical or surgical care.”); ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (2010) (“Any minor who 
is 14 years of age or older, or has graduated from high school, or is married, or having 
been married is divorced or is pregnant may give effective consent to any legally 
authorized medical, dental, health or mental health services for himself or herself, 
and the consent of no other person shall be necessary.”). 
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Research shows that by the time they reach sixteen, adolescents 
have the same cognitive capacity as adults to make decisions about 
medical treatment.204  Adolescents who are sixteen have essentially 
the same cognitive abilities as adults to process and understand 
information and to appreciate the nature of a given situation.205  The 
risk-taking behavior and “impetuous and ill-considered actions” of 
adolescents that the Court noted in Roper is generally not attributed 
to limited cognitive development but rather to emotionally charged or 
high-pressure situations that require adolescents to control 
impulses.206  Most scholars agree that health decisions are devoid of 
the same stressors that compromise adolescent decision-making in 
other contexts.207  To this point, three studies examining the decision 
making process of adolescents who are deciding whether to undergo 
an abortion found that adolescents conceptualized and considered 
treatment in the same manner as adults.208 
Most states have also carved out exceptions in their informed 
consent statutes, recognizing that certain adolescents may be able to 
provide informed consent despite being minors.209  These exceptions 
may be divided into two categories: statutes that permit minors to 
give informed consent when they hold a certain status and statutes 
                                                                                                                 
 204. Oullette, supra note 199, at 144 (“Consistently research on the development 
of adolescent decision making, judgment, and brain development supports the 
capacity of adolescents in medical decision making, when the criteria for measuring 
decisional capacity in adults are applied.”); see also Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature 
Citizens and the State, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1055, 1109 (2010). 
 205. Hamilton, supra note 204, at 1109; see also Andrew Newman, Adolescent 
Consent to Routine Medical and Surgical Treatment, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 501, 528 
(2001) (“There seems to be agreement that somewhere around the age of 15 of 16, 
persons acquire sufficient decisional capacity to make reasoned decisions.”). 
 206. Newman, supra note 205, at 528. 
 207. Ouellette, supra note 199, at 146 (“Most scholars argue that the deficiencies 
(impulsiveness, excessive risk-taking, susceptibility to peer pressure) are not relevant 
in the healthcare context to the same degree they are in the juvenile justice 
context.”). 
 208. Shield, supra note 31, at 403 (citing Bruce Ambuel, Developmental Trends in 
Adolescents’ Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 129 (1992); Catherine C. Lewis, A Comparison of Minors’ and Adults’ 
Pregnancy Decisions, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446 (1980)) (finding that 
“adolescents could conceptualize and reason about treatment possibilities as capably 
as adults.”). 
 209. Newman, supra note 205, at 504 (“There are exceptions to the standard rule 
that, until one reaches majority, one cannot lawfully make a final decision as to 
medical treatment.  Two exceptions that are generally recognized are the emergency 
exception and ‘the emancipated minor’ exception.”). 
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that allow minors to give informed consent when they are seeking a 
particular kind of procedure.210 
The status-based exceptions allow a minor to give informed 
consent when they are emancipated, married, have children, are in 
the military, or are deemed to be a “mature minor” by a court.211  For 
instance, New York provides that minors who are married or have 
given birth may give consent for their own health and the health of 
their children.212  The mature minor exception requires a court to 
assess whether a minor’s decision-making capacity is that of an 
adult.213 
Courts have recognized the validity of a mature minor adjudication 
in the context of a right to refuse treatment.214  In In re E.G., the 
Supreme Court of Illinois held that a seventeen-year-old girl with 
leukemia, who would not consent to a medically necessary blood 
transfusion because she was a Jehovah’s Witness, had a right to refuse 
such treatment.215  The court noted that while the age of consent was 
eighteen in Illinois, a minor is entitled to exercise a right to refuse 
treatment if there is clear and convincing evidence she is “mature 
enough to exercise the judgment of an adult.”216  The court also noted 
that the state’s status and procedure-based exceptions to informed 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Shield, supra note 31, at 398. 
 211. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(1),(2) (McKinney 2012); Shield, supra note 31, 
at 419 (citing other states: GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2(a)(3) (2006); MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. § 20-102 (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-103 (West 
2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-330 (2015); 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
10101 (West 2015)). 
 212. See Shield, supra note 31, at 419. 
 213. Id. at 399; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (“We therefore conclude 
that if the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents’ 
consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure whereby 
authorization for the abortion can be obtained.”). 
 214. Martin T. Harvey, Adolescent Competency and the Refusal of Medical 
Treatment, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 297, 301–08 (2003) (explaining a minor may be 
granted informed consent if she can “prove competency by evidencing her capacity to 
provide a thorough understanding of the consequences of her proposed decision to 
terminate treatment along with well articulated reasons as to why her decision ought 
to be respected”); see In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327–28 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1989); In re 
Rena, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 335, 337–38 (1999) (finding lower court erred in not making 
a determination as to a seventeen-year-old girl’s maturity); but see, In re Long Island 
Jewish Medical Center, 17 Misc.2d 724, 730 (Sup. Ct. of Westchester 1990) (“While 
this Court believes there is much merit to the ‘mature minor’ doctrine, I find that 
[petitioner] is not a mature minor.”). 
 215. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 323–25. 
 216. Id. at 328. 
2016] FIXING MEDICAID TO "FIX SOCIETY" 109 
consent indicate that the legislature did not intend for a bright line 
age-based barrier to informed consent.217 
The procedure-based exceptions allow minors to give informed 
consent for certain procedures.218  Following the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Carey v. International Population Services,219 a number of 
states permit minors to give informed consent to obtain 
contraceptives or abortions without parental consent.220  New York 
also allows minors to give informed consent for procedures that are 
not constitutionally protected, such as prenatal care, substance abuse 
treatment, and certain outpatient mental health services.221 
Thus, statutory definitions and exceptions to the doctrine of 
informed consent may provide support for removing the age-based 
restrictions in section 505.2.  Definitions of informed consent 
generally focus on the decision-making capacity of individuals.222  
Despite being more prone to emotionally charged situations, 
adolescents have been shown to have the same decision-making 
capacity as adults and may exercise the same or similar judgment as 
adults when making healthcare related decisions.223  Furthermore, 
states appear to have recognized that, in some health contexts, 
adolescents have the capacity to give informed consent.224  Although 
the doctrine of informed consent presumes minors are incapable of 
making informed decisions, the definitions and exceptions to the 
doctrine also suggest that adolescents may have the capacity to make 
                                                                                                                 
 217. Id. at 325–26 (citing the state’s status-based exception and procedure-based 
exceptions and finding that the “two acts, when read together in a complementary 
fashion, indicate that the legislature did not intend that there be an absolute 18–year–
old age barrier prohibiting minors from consenting to medical treatment.”). 
 218. See Shield, supra note 31, at 399. 
 219. Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 695–96 (1977). 
 220. Shield, supra note 31, at 399 (explaining the Supreme Court’s holding in Carey 
v. Population Services International, which indicated that states cannot ban minors 
from obtaining contraception, and that states have extended this ruling to allow 
minors to access contraceptives without parental consent); see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 6925 (West 1996) (allowing minors to consent to an abortion without parental 
consent). 
 221. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2504 (McKinney 2012) (allowing pregnant minors to 
consent prenatal care); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 22.11(c) (McKinney 2016) 
(allowing minors to consent to substance abuse treatment); see also N.Y. MENTAL 
HYG. LAW § 33.21 (McKinney 2016) (providing for medical practitioners to provide 
outpatient mental health treatment to minors where the minor voluntarily seeks 
services, and their parents are unavailable or have refused to consent to the health 
treatment which the practitioner determines is medically necessary). 
 222. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 710.1 (2016). 
 223. Newman, supra note 205, at 528; Ouellette, supra note 199, at 146. 
 224. Shield, supra note 31, at 398. 
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informed health decisions such as undergoing gender-affirming 
treatment. 
C. Age Restrictions May Give Rise to Legal Claims 
As noted above, the medical community’s current view of treating 
GD and the doctrine of informed consent provides rationales that 
support and oppose the age-based restrictions for Medicaid coverage 
of gender-affirming treatment.225  Additionally, there may be 
conflicting views as to whether age-based restrictions on Medicaid 
coverage for gender-affirming treatment will give rise to valid legal 
claims or the withholding of federal Medicaid funds, which would 
justify removing the restrictions.  State programs, such as New York’s, 
that deny coverage of gender-affirming treatment on the basis of age 
may be susceptible to legal claims brought by individuals under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which prohibits 
programs from discriminating on the basis of gender identity.226  
Likewise, states that restrict Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming 
treatment on the basis of age may be subject to HHS enforcement 
actions on the grounds that such restrictions violate 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 
et seq., otherwise known as the Medicaid Act.227 
1. Age-Based Restrictions Could Give Rise to Claims Under the 
Affordable Care Act 
A Medicaid regulation that imposes age restrictions on hormone 
therapy and gender affirming surgery could give rise to legal claims 
brought under the Affordable Care Act.  Since its passage in 2010, the 
ACA has been described as the biggest overhaul of the U.S. 
healthcare system since the authorization of Medicaid and Medicare 
in 1965.228  The Act implemented a number of reforms that were 
intended to improve the quality of and access to healthcare, while 
                                                                                                                 
 225. See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B. 
 226. See 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012). 
 227. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(c) (2012). 
 228. 70C AM. JUR. 2D Social Security and Medicare § 1905 (2016), (“The 
contemplated changes to the U.S. healthcare system, resulting from the Act, have 
been described as being ‘on a scale not seen since the enactment of Medicare in 
1965.’”); James Vicini et al., Top Court Upholds Healthcare Law in Obama Triumph, 
REUTERS (Jun. 28, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcare-court-
idUSBRE85R06420120628 [https://perma.cc/ZAP7-EBVL] (“The healthcare law, 
known formally as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, is the biggest 
overhaul of the $2.6 trillion healthcare system in about 50 years.”). 
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also lowering the costs of healthcare.229  Pursuant to its goal of 
increasing access to affordable healthcare, the ACA prohibits 
insurance providers and state Medicaid programs from discriminating 
on the basis of race, sex, age, or disability.230 
It is unclear whether challenges to the age-based restrictions in 
section 505.2 would succeed.  First, while HHS has implied that 
disparate coverage for transgender individuals amounts to sex 
discrimination,231 federal courts have yet to recognize transgender 
identity as a protected status.232 
The ACA’s prohibition on sex discrimination draws its authority 
from Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.233  Title IX 
prohibits programs that receive federal financial assistance from 
denying benefits on the basis of sex.234  Although the ACA does not 
explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity, the 
Director of the HHS Office for Civil Rights, the body that enforces 
the anti-discrimination provisions of the ACA, issued a letter to 
trans-rights advocates clarifying HHS’s view that the ACA anti-
discrimination provision extends to discrimination on the basis of 
                                                                                                                 
 229. See generally Key Features of the Affordable Care Act by Year, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts-and-features/key-
features-of-aca-by-year/index.html# [https://perma.cc/BG4T-8SW6] (last updated 
Aug. 13, 2015). 
 230. See 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012). 
 231. See Letter from Leon Rodriguez, Dir. of Office for Civil Rights, Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., to Maya Rupert, Fed. Policy Dir., Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian 
Rights (July 12, 2012), https://www.nachc.com/client/OCRLetterJuly2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F3CB-8VYN]; see also Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and 
Activities, 80 Fed. Reg. 54,172 (proposed Sept. 8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 92). 
 232. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. 
Supp. 3d 657, 674 (W.D. Pa. 2015). 
 233. 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided for in this title . . . an 
individual shall not, on the ground prohibited under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 
U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), or 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794), be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, 
any health program or activity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial 
assistance, including credits, subsidies, or contracts of insurance, or under any 
program or activity that is administered by an Executive Agency or any entity 
established under this title (or amendments).  The enforcement mechanisms provided 
for and available under such title VI, title IX, section 504, or such Age Discrimination 
Act shall apply for purposes of violations of this subsection.”). 
 234. 20 U.S.C. §1681(a) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis 
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”). 
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gender identity and sex stereotypes.235  Moreover, HHS has also 
proposed using its rule to implement the anti-discrimination provision 
of the ACA, which defines sex stereotypes as including “expectations 
that gender can only be constructed within two distinct opposite and 
disconnected forms (masculinity and femininity), and that gender 
cannot be constructed outside of this gender construct (individuals 
who identify as neither, both, or a combination of male and 
female).”236  The proposed regulation contains provisions that 
specifically address discrimination against transgender individuals in 
health insurance and Medicaid coverage.237  Under these provisions, 
an explicit, categorical exclusion of coverage for all health services 
related to gender affirmation would be unlawful sex discrimination.238  
Likewise, the proposed rule elaborates that limiting coverage or 
denying coverage of a specific claim on the basis of gender identity 
might also be prohibited under the ACA.239  Individuals might thus 
seek to bring claims against the state on these grounds. 
Individual Medicaid recipients would also have a private cause of 
action to challenge a state’s Medicaid program under Title IX.240  The 
ACA expressly adopts the enforcement mechanisms of Title IX to 
prohibit a denial of benefits on the basis of sex,241 and the United 
States Supreme Court has read an implied right of action into Title 
IX.242  In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Court held that while 
it is better for Congress to specify when a statute provides a right of 
action, its failure to do so is not dispositive.243  Examining Title IX, the 
Court used a four-factor test to find that the statute was intended to 
include a private right of action.244  Additionally, the Court noted that 
                                                                                                                 
 235. See Letter from Leon Rodriguez, supra note 231. 
 236. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 80 Fed. Reg. at 54,172. 
 237. Id. at 69 (“Paragraphs (b)(3) through (5) of the proposed rule specifically 
address discrimination faced by transgender individuals in accessing coverage of 
health services.”). 
 238. Id. at 72–73 (“Based on these principles, an explicit, categorical (or automatic) 
exclusion of coverage for all health services related to gender transition is unlawful 
on its face under paragraph (b)(4); in singling out the entire category of services and 
treatments for gender-affirming care, such an exclusion systematically denies services 
and treatments for transgender individuals and is prohibited discrimination on the 
basis of sex.”). 
 239. Id. at 73. 
 240. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2016). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 65 (1992); Cannon v. Univ. 
of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979). 
 243. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717. 
 244. Id. at 688.  Citing its decision in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), the Court 
held that a court must first review the following four factors before deciding whether 
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Title IX was modeled on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,245 which was 
intended to offer victims of discrimination a private cause of action.246  
Litigants would thus have standing to bring a claim under Title IX, 
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge age-based restrictions in section 
505.2.  However, the likelihood of success of these claims may be 
uncertain given courts’ interpretation of Title IX as it applies to 
discrimination on the basis of gender identity. 
Although HHS has made clear its view that discrimination on the 
basis of transgender identity is unlawful under Title IX, courts have 
not recognized transgender identity as a protected status under Title 
IX. 247  For instance, in Johnston v. University of Pittsburgh, the 
Western District of Pennsylvania held that a university receiving 
federal funds did not violate Title IX by prohibiting a transgender 
male student from using sex-segregated locker rooms and 
bathrooms.248  In order to determine whether the language of Title IX 
could be construed as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
gender identity, the court referred to Title VII claims of employment 
discrimination.249  Circuit Courts have generally held that Title VII 
does not prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity, but rather only prohibits employers from discriminating on 
the basis of a traditional binary formulation of sex.250  Thus, while it 
                                                                                                                 
a federal statute provides a private of action: “1) whether the statute was enacted for 
the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a member, (2) whether there is 
any indication of legislative intent to create a private remedy, (3) whether implication 
of such a remedy is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme, 
and (4) whether implying a federal remedy is inappropriate because the subject 
matter involves an area basically of concern to the States.” Id. at 689–709. 
 245. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2012). 
 246. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703 (“We have no doubt that Congress intended to create 
Title IX remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and that it 
understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of 
the prohibited discrimination.”). 
 247. See Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 
97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 674 (W.D. Pa. 2015); Letter from Leon Rodriguez, supra note 231. 
 248. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 661. 
 249. Id. at 674. 
 250. Id. at 675 (citing Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 
1984), which held: “The words of Title VII do not outlaw discrimination against a 
person who has a sexual identity disorder, i.e., a person born with a male body who 
believes himself to be female, or a person born with a female body who believes 
herself to be male; a prohibition against discrimination based on an individual’s sex is 
not synonymous with a prohibition against discrimination on an individual’s sexual 
identity disorder or discontent with the sex into which they were born.”); see also 
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (“In light of the 
traditional binary conception of sex, transsexuals may not claim protection under 
Title VII from discrimination based solely on their status as a transsexual.”). 
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may be illegal to discriminate against a woman or a man because of 
their sex assigned at birth, it is not unlawful to discriminate against a 
transgender woman because of her transgender identity.251  Following 
this reading of Title VII, the court in Johnston held that neither Title 
VII nor Title IX would provide a basis for a discrimination claim on 
the basis of transgender status without Congressional adoption of a 
broader definition of “sex.”252 
In order to avoid the plain language of Title VII or Title IX, 
transgender litigants might argue that a denial of coverage was based 
on their failure to meet sex stereotypes.253  In Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins,254 the Supreme Court held that an employer violated Title 
VII when it denied a female employee a promotion on the grounds 
that she did meet stereotypes associated with women.255  Transgender 
litigants might find support with this theory as the Department of 
Education has released letters of clarification, informing school 
districts that it will apply the prohibition on sex-stereotyping of Title 
VII to Title IX.256  Courts have also construed Title IX as prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of non-conformity with gender 
stereotypes.257  However, it is not evident that litigants would prevail 
under a sex-stereotyping theory, as the court in Johnston held that the 
                                                                                                                 
 251. Ulane, 742 F. 2d at 1085; cf. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 
(D.D.C. 2008). 
 252. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 676–77. 
 253. Id. at 679–80. 
 254. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989). 
 255. Id. at 250 (“[A]n employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman 
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”). 
 256. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON 
TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 5 (2014) (“Title IX’s sex discrimination prohibition 
extends to claims of discrimination based on gender identity or failure to conform to 
stereotypical notions of masculinity or femininity and OCR accepts such complaints 
for investigation.”) http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-
ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/MR3D-7FXD]; Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for 
Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Colleague (Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201010.html 
[https://perma.cc/NM6G-CFHN] (explaining to school officials across the country 
that Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination prohibits harassment of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, or transgender students based on gender nonconformity).. 
 257. Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 256; see Wolfe v. Fayatteville, Ark. Sch. 
Dist., 648 F. 3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding the district court’s jury 
instructions that a Title IX claim must show that harassment in school was motivated 
by the plaintiff’s “gender or his failure to conform to stereotypical male 
characteristics”); Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 151 & n.9 
(N.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the Supreme Court looked to its interpretation of Title 
VII when considering sex discrimination under Title IX in Davis v. Monroe County  
Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 631 (1999), and Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 74 (1992)). 
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University did not discriminate on the basis of sex stereotypes.258  The 
court reasoned that instead of requiring that the student dress or act a 
certain way consistent with a gender role, the University distinguished 
the plaintiff from others on the basis of his sex assigned at birth.259  
Thus, it may be difficult for litigants to pursue a sex-stereotyping 
theory where the Medicaid program is not classifying or 
distinguishing individuals on the basis of their conduct. 
In addition to facing challenges as to whether Title IX would 
prohibit the age-based restriction of Medicaid coverage, litigants 
would also have to show that the restriction did in fact discriminate 
on the basis of sex.260  Litigants might be able to argue that the age 
restrictions are discriminatory as they deny transgender youth 
medically necessary treatments that are otherwise offered to 
cisgender youth.261  Claimants could offer evidence of the surgeries 
such as “complete mastectomy, mammoplasty, plastic operation on 
breasts, reconstructive surgery of the genitalia, amputation of the 
penis, plastic operation on penis, orchiectomy, scrotoplasty, 
urethroplasty, construction of artificial vagina with or without graft, 
vulvectomy, episioplasty, salpingo-ooporectomy, and hysterectomy,” 
are all listed on the state’s schedule for reimbursement and could thus 
be available to cisgender minors who require these procedures for 
conditions other than GD. 262  In addition, claimants could offer 
evidence that puberty suppressors could be covered for cisgender 
youth but not for transgender youth as the FDA has approved use of 
certain hormones for the treatment of early onset puberty, diagnosed 
as “precocious puberty.”263  For instance, New York’s Medicaid 
                                                                                                                 
 258. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 681. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 261. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction and Class Certification at 3, Cruz v. Zucker, No. 14 CV 4456 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 3, 2014). 
 262. Id. at 23–24 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 533.5 (2016)). 
 263. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING 
INFORMATION: SUPPRELIN LA, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2013/022058s011lbl.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CM4U-BS7E] (“SUPPRELIN LA (histrelin acetate) subcutaneous 
implant is indicated for the treatment of children with central precocious puberty 
(CPP).”); Regan Morris, Transgender 13-Year-Old Zoey Having Therapy, BBC (Jan. 
12, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30783983 
[https://perma.cc/XNB3-MTVY] (“The puberty suppressors Zoey and others take are 
reversible and FDA-approved because they have been used for decades in children 
going through premature puberty.”). 
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program currently covers prescriptions for the drug Lupron Depot,264 
which has been approved by the FDA to treat precocious puberty.265  
Showing this disparity in coverage could support a claim under the 
ACA that the state is impermissibly limiting coverage on the basis of 
transgender identity. 
On the other hand, it is also unclear as to whether such evidence 
would be sufficient, even if a court considers the view of HHS.  While 
Zucker proved to be successful and consisted of claims under the 
Medicaid Act and Title IX, a case brought by transgender youth 
would face a number of new obstacles.  First, it may be difficult to 
obtain evidence that Medicaid provides coverage for hormones for 
cisgender adolescents or coverage for genital surgery.266  The state has 
also asserted that the age restriction was put in place because the 
FDA has not approved puberty suppressants or hormones to treat 
GD for individuals under the age of eighteen.267  In at least one other 
state, however, Medicaid would cover puberty suppressants because 
the FDA has approved the use of such drugs to treat precocious 
puberty.268  The conflicting views of the HHS and the courts as to 
whether Title IX would prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
transgender identity provide support and opposition to the assertion 
that the age-based restriction is vulnerable to legal challenges.  
Further, it is also unclear whether or not there would be factual or 
legal support for a discrimination claim under the ACA and, 
consequently, whether the age-based-restriction on Medicaid 
coverage leaves the state vulnerable to legal challenges brought by 
individuals. 
                                                                                                                 
 264. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, MEDICAID LIST OF REIMBURSABLE DRUGS 273 
(2016), https://www.emedny.org/info/fullform.pdf [https://perma.cc/N88G-DNEK]. 
 265. See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LUPRON DEPOT (LEOPROLIDE 
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 267. N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, TRANSGENDER RELATED CARE AND SERVICES 13–14, 
(2015) http://health.ny.gov/regulations/recently_adopted/docs/2015-03-
11_transgender_related_care_and_services.pdf [https://perma.cc/RL3M-DMYS]. 
 268. Morris, supra note 263. 
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2. Age Restrictions May Be Vulnerable to Challenges Under the 
Reasonable Standards Requirement of the Medicaid Act 
In addition to claims brought by individuals, New York’s age-based 
restriction on Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming healthcare may 
also face enforcement actions by HHS for violating Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act (the Medicaid Act).  While individuals do not 
have a private right of action under the Medicaid Act, the Secretary 
of HHS is authorized to withhold Medicaid funds from a state that 
violates the Medicaid Act.269  The Medicaid Act requires states to 
implement Medicaid programs with “reasonable standards”270 that 
must aim to provide medical services “sufficient in amount, duration, 
and scope to reasonably achieve its purpose.”271  In addition, states 
may not arbitrarily deny or reduce treatment solely because of the 
type of illness.272  Because there is some support from the medical 
community that gender affirming treatment is medically necessary for 
adolescents, the Secretary could find that the age-based restriction is 
unreasonable.273  In this circumstance, New York could risk the 
withdrawal of Medicaid funding by the Secretary of HHS. 
a. The Medicaid Act Conditions Federal Funding of State Medicaid 
Programs on Certain Requirements 
Medicaid regulations that limit coverage of gender-affirming 
healthcare on the basis of age might be viewed as failing to comply 
with the requirements of the Medicaid Act.274  The objective of the 
Medicaid Act was to enable states to provide medical assistance to 
those who could not afford it.275  In order to meet this objective, the 
Medicaid Act authorizes the federal government to disburse funds to 
states with Medicaid programs that provide medical assistance and 
treatment to individuals who meet income and categorical eligibility 
requirements.276 
                                                                                                                 
 269. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(c) (2012). 
 270. See Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 506 (8th Cir. 2006) (“While a state 
has considerable discretion to fashion medical assistance under its Medicaid plain, 
this discretion is constrained by the reasonable-standards requirement.”). 
 271. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (2012). 
 272. Id. 
 273. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (2012). 
 274. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq (2012). 
 275. Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 571–72 (1982). 
 276. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2012). 
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The Supreme Court views the Medicaid Act as a contract between 
the states and the federal government.277  States thus must comply 
with federal Medicaid statutes and regulations in order to receive 
federal Medicaid funds.278  Under § 1396(c) of the Medicaid Act, the 
Secretary of HHS is authorized to withhold all or a portion of a state’s 
Medicaid funds when a state “breaches” the contract by failing to 
comply with the requirements of the Act.279  In Armstrong v. 
Exceptional Child Center, the Court held that Congress intended § 
1396(c) to be the exclusive remedy for a state’s failure to comply with 
the Act.280  Under this framework, the Court held that the Medicaid 
Act does not provide an implied right of action and, therefore, may 
not be enforced by private claims.281  As such, states will not face 
private litigation under the Medicaid Act, but could still face 
enforcement action from the Secretary of HHS. 
b. Programs That Restrict Coverage of Gender-Affirming 
Healthcare May Be Interpreted as Unreasonable 
Section 1396(a) of the Medicaid Act requires that all state 
Medicaid programs provide coverage for seven broad categories of 
medical assistance: inpatient hospital, outpatient hospital, laboratory 
and x-ray, nursing facility, physician, nurse-midwife, and nurse-
practitioner services.282  States may also provide coverage for optional 
services, such as prescription drugs;283 however, they must comply 
with federal regulations if they choose to do so.284  While the Medicaid 
Act broadly requires that these services be provided, states have the 
authority to decide the type and range of services covered and the 
eligibility of individuals.285  In determining the scope of coverage, 
states must use “reasonable standards . . . for determining eligibility 
                                                                                                                 
 277. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1387 (2015) (citing 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, (1981)). 
 278. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a, 1396c (2012). 
 279. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012). 
 280. Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1385. 
 281. Id. 
 282. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(A); Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 504 (8th Cir. 
2006) (“To receive federal approval the Medicaid act mandates that a plan include 
only seven enumerated medical services.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1) (2012). 
 283. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(11)–(12). 
 284. Lankford, 541 F.3d at 504. 
 285. 42 C.F.R. § 430.0 (2012) (“Within broad Federal rules, each State decides 
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for and the extent of medical assistance.”286  These standards must be 
“based on such criteria as medical necessity or on utilization control 
procedures”287 and may not deny or reduce coverage of a medical 
treatment “to an otherwise eligible beneficiary solely because of the 
diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.”288  Further, federal Medicaid 
regulations require that each service that is covered under a state’s 
plan “must be sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to reasonably 
achieve its purpose.”289  A state plan that chooses to cover a service, 
therefore cannot arbitrarily exclude coverage for certain items or 
treatments within that service.290 
There is support for viewing the age-based restriction of section 
505.2 as an unreasonable standard and, therefore, not in compliance 
with the Medicaid Act.  In Lankford v. Sherman, for instance, the 
Eighth Circuit held that a plan that excludes a non-experimental and 
medically necessary treatment from a covered service is per se 
unreasonable.291  Additionally, in Beal v. Doe, the Supreme Court 
noted in dicta that a Medicaid program seriously conflicts with the 
objectives of the Medicaid Act if it does not cover medically 
necessary treatment.292  Given that HHS has already acknowledged 
the medical necessity of gender-affirming healthcare for Medicare 
recipients,293 it may similarly view exclusion of these services from 
coverage as unreasonable. 
Section 505.2 may also be construed as unreasonable should the 
Secretary find that it is discriminatory.  The Medicaid Act requires 
that “the medical assistance made available to any individual . . . shall 
not be less in amount, duration, or scope than the medical assistance 
                                                                                                                 
 286. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 441 (1977) (“Although 
[the Medicaid Act] does not require States to provide funding for all medical 
treatment falling within the [seven] general categories, it does require that state 
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 287. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (2012). 
 288. Id. § 440.230(c). 
 289. Id. § 440.230(b). 
 290. Lankford, 541 F.3d at 511. 
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 292. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1977) (discussing the validity of a Medicaid 
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questions might be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical 
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 293. H.H.S. Medicare Decision, supra note 84, at 20. 
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made available to any other such individual” who is covered by that 
state’s Medicaid program.294  In addition, a state “may not arbitrarily 
reduce the amount, duration, or scope of a required service . . . solely 
because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.”295  Should the 
Secretary view the age-based restrictions as limiting coverage on the 
basis of a condition, it may find that section 505.2 violates the 
Medicaid Act.  However, similar to a Title IX claim, the Secretary 
would have to find evidence that certain treatments are covered for 
cisgender youth, but not for transgender youth when intended to treat 
GD.  There may be little evidence to suggest that cisgender youth 
have greater access to puberty suppressors or other procedures that 
might also be gender-affirming treatments. 
The Secretary could also find that the age restrictions are 
unreasonable, as they contradict the Medicaid Act’s requirement that 
state plans provide Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and 
Treatment (EPSDT).  The Medicaid Act mandates all states to 
provide EPSDT for Medicaid eligible children under the age of 
twenty-one.296  EPSDT consists of regular screenings and treatment of 
“mental illnesses and conditions discovered by screening services, 
whether or not such services are covered under the State plan.”297  As 
such, EPSDT requires states to provide screening and treatment for 
Medicaid-eligible children.298  An adolescent could therefore be 
diagnosed with GD under EPSDT and require treatment but 
ultimately be denied treatment because of the age-based restrictions 
of section 505.  However, at least one court has found that EPSDT 
services are still subject to, and may be denied on, the basis of the 
state’s determination that such treatment is not medically necessary.299 
The state may therefore be vulnerable to enforcement action by 
the HHS on the basis that the age-based restriction is unreasonable 
and violates the Medicaid Act.  While there is some support to 
suggest that the HHS could proceed with such an action, the 
Secretary may also be unable to do so without greater evidence of the 
medical necessity of gender-affirming treatments for adolescents and 
evidence that the age-based restriction discriminates on the basis of 
transgender identity. 
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III.  PROPOSAL FOR MEDICAID REGULATIONS THAT 
EXTEND COVERAGE TO TRANSGENDER YOUTH 
Given the myriad of issues that arise from Medicaid regulations 
that exclude coverage of gender-affirming healthcare on the basis of 
age, states should consider viable alternatives.  One alternative to the 
age-based restriction is to replace the bright-line age limit with a case-
by-case assessment of the individual recipient that is aligned with the 
WPATH Standards of Care.300  This Part explains how replacing the 
restrictions would ensure that the state’s Medicaid program covers 
medically necessary treatment, resolve any conflicts that the Medicaid 
program might have with the doctrine of informed consent, and avoid 
the risk of litigation that the state might face under the current age-
based restriction.  Further, this Part discusses the likely policy 
outcomes and costs that justify removing the age-based restriction. 
A. Necessary Provisions for a Trans-Inclusive Medicaid Program 
to Meet Medical and Legal Standards 
States would avoid the issues that age restrictions present by 
amending or enacting regulations that are aligned with the WPATH 
Standard of Care.  In so doing, states would provide for a more 
flexible approach that is based on the individual recipient’s need for 
treatment.301  Additionally, removing the blanket age restriction 
would allow states to comply with principles of informed consent and 
recognize the exceptions to informed consent.302  States would further 
find that aligning Medicaid regulations with the WPATH Standard of 
Care would provide safeguards against inadequate treatment and 
erroneous diagnoses of GD. 
1. States Should Align Regulations with WPATH Standards 
States should amend their Medicaid regulations so as to align them 
with the WPATH Standards of Care.  By doing so, states would avoid 
possible HHS litigation and regulation.303  Aligning regulations to the 
WPATH Standards of Care would also avoid conflicts with the 
medical consensus on gender identity because it would determine 
coverage on an individualized basis, provide sufficient safeguards so 
as to ensure that individuals receive care they need, provide standards 
to determine whether health professionals are eligible to treat 
                                                                                                                 
 300. See generally WPATH, supra note 23. 
 301. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 302. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 303. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
122 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
transgender patients, and develop contemporaneously with research 
in the field.304  By aligning regulations with the WPATH Standards of 
Care, states would remove the age restrictions for Medicaid coverage 
of gender-affirming healthcare and also address the concerns of cost 
and efficacy on which the age restriction is predicated.305 
a. Aligning Regulations with the WPATH Standards of Care 
Would Determine Coverage on an Individual Basis Rather Than a 
Fixed Age 
By aligning their Medicaid statutes with the WPATH Standards of 
Care, states would determine Medicaid coverage for gender-affirming 
healthcare on a basis that is more consistent with the generally 
accepted view of the medical community.  The Standards of Care 
provides guidelines for mental health practitioners working with 
gender-nonconforming youth, noting that health professionals should 
work with individuals to assess their desire and medical necessity for 
gender-affirming healthcare.306  This approach is preferable to 
determining eligibility for gender-affirming healthcare on the basis of 
a fixed-age limit, as psychology experts have argued that 
“psychological and somatic maturity varies largely 
interindividually.”307  Given the varying levels of maturity between 
individuals under the age of eighteen, experts have found that a 
determination of treatment based on a fixed age is arbitrary and less 
appropriate than a determination based on individual evaluation.308 
Determining Medicaid coverage on an individual basis would 
further avoid the potential litigation described in Part II of this 
Note.309  Providing coverage on an individual basis would preclude 
challenges under the ACA.310  Also, as noted earlier, challenges under 
the ACA would likely assert that state plans discriminate on the basis 
of gender identity by providing coverage for hormone therapy and 
gender-affirming surgical procedures for cisgender adolescents but 
not for transgender adolescents.311  Under the individualized approach 
of the Standards of Care, states would provide these same treatments 
on the permissible basis of medical necessity, allowing for some 
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transgender adolescents to access treatment.  Litigants would 
therefore be unlikely to assert that the individualized approach 
determines coverage on the impermissible basis of gender identity. 
Adopting the WPATH Standards of Care would also avoid HHS 
enforcement actions.  Under the Medicaid Act, the Secretary of HHS 
is authorized to withhold Medicaid funds when states violate the 
Medicaid Act.312  Under a WPATH-aligned regulation, the Secretary 
would not be authorized to withhold funds on the grounds that the 
state was failing to provide reasonable standards.  Further, if states 
amended regulations to expressly align with the WPATH Standards 
of Care, they would ensure that the Medicaid regulations remained 
reasonable even as the field of transgender health developed.  As an 
international organization, WPATH has issued new editions of the 
Standards of Care to remain consistent with developments in the field 
of transgender health.  For instance, transgender advocates and 
health professionals have noted that the most recent edition of the 
Standards of Care made a number of significant modifications and 
improvements.313 
In addition to providing a medically sound basis for extending 
coverage to transgender youth, aligning regulations with the WPATH 
Standards of Care would provide quality control measures to ensure 
individuals receive proper healthcare and assessment.  The WPATH 
Standards of Care set forth standards of competency for health 
professionals working with transgender youth that exceeds standards 
of competency observed in New York.314  Under section 505.2, mental 
health professionals are authorized to refer patients for gender-
affirming healthcare if they are qualified New York state-licensed 
professionals.315  The WPATH provides a higher standard, requiring 
that health professionals have knowledge of gender-nonconformity 
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and assessment of gender dysphoria treatment and that they pursue 
continuing education of gender dysphoria assessment.316  These 
requirements would provide stronger safeguards to ensure Medicaid 
recipients receive gender-affirming healthcare when it is necessary.  
Further, these safeguards would also encourage medical professionals 
to develop their cultural competency317 when working with 
transgender youth, and prevent litigation under the ACA’s provision 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity. 
2. New York Should Align Its Regulation with the Exceptions for 
Informed Consent 
A state regulation that does not implement an age-based restriction 
on Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming healthcare would also 
avoid conflicting with the principles of the informed consent doctrine 
and its exceptions.  As noted in Part II of this Note, a fixed-age 
restriction would conflict with the doctrine of informed consent and 
the exceptions to informed consent.318  Age-based restrictions bar 
youth that have been deemed “mature minors” from accessing 
gender-affirming healthcare, despite the youth’s authorization to 
provide informed consent.  States that remove age limits in their 
Medicaid regulations will allow these youth, who are deemed capable 
of giving informed consent, the ability to make their own health 
choices pursuant to their status-based exception.  Further, removing 
the age-based restrictions would also be consistent with the 
procedure-based exceptions that many states have.  As noted in Part 
II, states permit minors to provide informed consent to certain kinds 
of procedures that are medically necessary but, nonetheless, require 
parental consent, such as contraceptives, abortions, and mental 
health.319  Gender-affirming healthcare could be considered 
comparable to these types of procedures in that they are medically 
necessary but are often denied as a result of parents’ refusal to 
consent.  In New York, youth are permitted to consent to certain 
kinds of mental health treatments yet are statutorily prohibited from 
consenting to gender-affirming healthcare, which is intended to treat 
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the mental condition of gender dysphoria.  By removing the age-
based restriction, youth would be permitted to consent to gender-
affirming healthcare, as they would be permitted to consent to other 
forms of mental health treatment. 
While the removing the age restrictions would allow states to 
consistently recognize the exceptions to informed consent, it would 
not necessarily remove the requirement for informed consent.  
Research suggests that there may not be an entirely objective 
criterion for diagnosing GD, such as chromosomes or hormonal 
levels.320  Moreover, because an individual’s gender identity is defined 
solely by his or her own intrinsic sense of gender, a regulation that did 
not require that the recipient be capable of understanding the 
consequences of undergoing gender-affirming procedures would 
contradict WPATH Standards, which also require the treating 
physician to abide by informed-consent law.  States that amend their 
regulations to remove the age restrictions would therefore provide 
access for youth who need gender-affirming healthcare and who have 
the mental and emotional capacity to understand their decision to 
pursue treatment for GD. 
B. Policy Justifications for Extending Medicaid Coverage of 
Gender-Affirming Healthcare 
Removing the age-based restrictions to Medicaid coverage may 
also have a number of positive policy implications.  Lifting the age-
based restriction in section 505.2 would align New York’s Medicaid 
coverage of gender-affirming treatment for youths with that of state 
agencies responsible for youths in custody.  In addition, restricting 
access to gender-affirming surgery that results in sterilization may 
prevent transgender youth who are over eighteen from obtaining the 
benefits that conform with their gender identity.321  Therefore, youth 
may be denied benefits because they sought medically necessary 
treatment.  Most importantly, by denying transgender youth in New 
York access to gender-affirming care, the state requires them to 
endure mental distress and, in so doing, puts them at a greater risk of 
physical harm. 
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1. Replacing the Age-Based Restrictions Will Resolve the Disparity 
in Health Coverage That Youth May Receive When in Custody of the 
State 
Removing the age-based restriction of Medicaid coverage of 
gender-affirming treatment would avoid a negative policy outcome 
whereby youth find they have access to gender-affirming treatment 
while in the custody of the state but do not have access to those same 
treatments when they are covered by Medicaid.  The Administration 
for Children’s Services (ACS) is the agency responsible for 
supervising child welfare, foster care, and juvenile justice in New 
York City.322  ACS is required by law to provide “necessary medical 
or surgical care . . . for any child needing such care and [to] pay for 
such care from public funds, if necessary.”323  In In re Brian L., the 
New York Appellate Division interpreted this statute to require ACS 
to pay for all necessary care, including that which is not covered by 
the state’s Medicaid regulations.324  Following the decision in Brian L., 
ACS released guidelines and procedures for requesting payment for 
Non-Medicaid Reimbursable Treatments (NMR), which were later 
amended to provide reimbursements of “gender-affirming healthcare 
associated with Gender Dysphoria,” often referred to as “trans-
related healthcare.”325 
Thus, under the NMR guidelines, children in ACS foster care or in 
the custody of New York State may be eligible for reimbursement for 
gender-affirming healthcare.326  In addition, the NMR guidelines also 
permit ACS to override the objection of parents or foster parents to 
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the child receiving gender-affirming healthcare.327  These guidelines 
may be a response to In re D.F. v. Carrion,328 where the New York 
Supreme Court found that ACS’s denial of reimbursement for sex-
reassignment surgery and hormone therapy was arbitrary and 
capricious.329  Similarly, youth who are in the custody of the State 
Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) may have access to 
gender-affirming healthcare.  In particular, OCFS’s Division of 
Juvenile Justice, which operates facilities for juvenile offenders, has 
its own Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Questioning Youth 
(LGBTQY) policy.330  This policy allows for youth to begin hormone 
therapy while they are in an OCFS facility if they meet the criteria for 
treatment in the WPATH Standards of Care.331 
By restricting Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming healthcare on 
the basis of age, the New York regulation may promote negative 
policy.  Youth who are in the custody of ACS or OCFS may be less 
inclined to reunite with their families and communities if they risk 
losing hormone therapy as a result.  Therefore, youth who are aware 
of the possibility of obtaining gender-affirming healthcare may also 
be inclined to either enter or remain in the custody of the state.  Thus, 
removing the age-based restrictions of Medicaid coverage for gender-
affirming treatment would achieve two positive outcomes.  First, it 
would allow for greater uniformity between the healthcare that is 
covered under Medicaid and that provided by ACS and OCFS.  
Second, by creating greater uniformity of coverage, the state would 
avoid creating incentives for youth to remain in the custody of the 
state or to enter into the custody of the state, where they may be able 
to obtain gender-affirming healthcare. 
2. Removing Age-Based Restrictions Will Allow Individuals to 
Obtain Benefits Based on Their Legal Sex Without Delay 
Lifting age-based restrictions for Medicaid coverage would also 
allow individuals to obtain a legal-sex status that is congruent with 
their gender identity.  Legal sex is an individual’s sex identity as 
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recognized by the law and is typically defined as one’s sex assignment 
at birth, based on biological genitalia.332  Legal rights and benefits are 
bound to legal sex as it may determine an individual’s marital rights, 
parental rights, placement in sex-segregated facilities such as prisons 
or homeless shelters, and the ability to access social services.333  Thus 
in order for transgender individuals to obtain benefits and rights that 
are congruent with their gender identity, they must first seek to 
obtain or amend their government identification so that it is 
congruent with their gender identity.334 
Typically, requirements for changing gender markers on 
identification vary by state and form of identification.  While the 
federal government has amended its requirements for passports, 
asking for “appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition to the 
new gender,” states still typically require documentation of genital 
surgery in order to change the legal gender of a birth certificate.335  
Though New York does not require genital surgery to change the 
gender marker on a birth certificate, an age-restriction that does 
impose this requirement would force transgender youth to live with 
an incongruent legal gender and deny them the rights and protections 
that a correct gender marker would confer.  Without a congruent 
legal sex, trans youth risk being placed in schools, foster homes, and 
juvenile justice centers that are incongruent with their gender 
identity.336 
Thus, removing the age-based restriction in states that condition 
legal sex on GD treatment would allow individuals to obtain a legal-
gender status that is congruent with their gender identity.  Doing so 
would result in youth obtaining gender-appropriate services, rights, 
and protections that they may not otherwise be afforded. 
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3. Mental Harm and Risk of Violence That Transgender Youth 
Face Without Treatment 
The most unfortunate result of the age-based restriction in section 
505.2 is the psychological pain that it would force transgender youth 
to endure.  Psychological authorities, including WPATH, the APA, 
and the AMA, as well as experts in the field, have recognized that 
adolescents under the age of eighteen may experience gender 
dysphoria.337  For some transgender adolescents, these feelings of 
distress may escalate to the point where youth experience “intense 
mental misery, isolation and despair if they are prevented from 
comprehensively living out their wish to belong to the other sex.”338  
For these individuals, a regulation that prevents them from obtaining 
puberty suppressors or other gender-affirming treatment may, thus, 
force them to endure great psychological pain against the 
recommendation of their own mental health practitioners. 
Evidence also suggests that delaying treatment of gender dysphoria 
may also allow comorbid mental conditions—distinct mental 
conditions that are co-occurring with GD—to persist.339  Adolescents 
and children experiencing gender dysphoria have shown elevated 
levels of emotional problems.340  In adolescents, the most common 
comorbid mental disorders are anxiety and depression.341  A number 
of studies have found that transgender youth are at an elevated risk 
for suicidal ideation and attempts.342  One study that focused on 
transgender youth, aged fifteen to twenty-one, found that forty-five 
percent of the participants had thought seriously about killing 
themselves, and half said that these thoughts were related to their 
transgender status.343  Another study that was not limited to 
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transgender youth found that rates of suicidal ideation were highest 
amongst participants aged thirteen to nineteen.344 
Studies suggest that depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideation may 
not be caused by gender dysphoria alone but, rather, is the result of 
being targets of negative societal attitudes.  Mental health 
professionals have found that an individual’s minority status as 
transgender places him or her at risk of being prejudiced or 
discriminated against, which in turn may induce anxiety or 
depression.345  The negative attitudes that a transgender youth 
experiences can “become internalized, manifesting as negative self-
concept, self-destructive behaviors, and low self-esteem.”346  In a 
study conducted by the Virginia Transgender Health Initiative, 
transgender youth who had been the victimized at school were almost 
four times more likely to attempt suicide than those who had not.347 
New York’s Medicaid restriction on hormone therapy and gender 
affirming surgery will force transgender youth to endure 
psychological pain.  There is little evidence to show that 
psychotherapy alone can alleviate feelings of gender dysphoria for 
individuals who meet the criteria for physical intervention.348  In 
contrast, the general conclusion drawn from studies measuring the 
success of hormone therapy and gender affirming surgery is that these 
treatments effectively resolve the gender dysphoria experienced by 
transgender individuals.349  As a result, a regulation that delays access 
to hormone therapy and gender affirming surgery will force some 
number of transgender youth to endure psychological pain. 
Delaying access to gender-affirming care may also exacerbate any 
comorbid mental health issues that a transgender individual is 
experiencing.  The anxiety and depression resulting from the 
adolescent process of consolidating and forming one’s identity by 
evaluating it in relation to society may be exacerbated if that 
individual is unable to substantively acknowledge his or her 
identity.350  A transgender youth who is denied access to gender-
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affirming healthcare, and is unable to openly acknowledge a major 
dimension of his or her subjectivity, may continue to struggle with this 
identity forming process in a way that induces anxiety or 
depression.351  In addition, the denial of early treatment may further 
expose an individual to minority status and victimization.  Puberty 
suppressors, gender-affirming surgeries, or hormone treatments prior 
to the development of secondary sex characteristics will facilitate 
transgender youth to outwardly express their gender identity to 
others, in a manner that makes them less susceptible to 
victimization.352  Further, a more inclusive regulation may help 
communities accept the existence of adolescent gender dysphoria, 
which in turn may reduce the negative societal attitudes concerning 
transgender youth. 
C. Cost Justifications for Extending Medicaid Coverage of 
Gender-Affirming Healthcare to Transgender Youth 
A state regulation that extended Medicaid coverage of gender-
affirming healthcare to individuals on a case-by-case basis might incur 
some additional costs by allowing greater access to gender affirming 
treatment.  However, these costs would be justified because they 
would be only marginally greater than the cost of providing coverage 
with an age-based restriction.  Further, an amended regulation would 
avoid other costs that the age restrictions would give rise to and 
would provide transgender youth with necessary medical care. 
1. Removing the Age Restriction Would Impose a Marginal Cost 
on States That Have Extended Medicaid Coverage for Gender-
Affirming Healthcare 
States may be able to estimate the additional cost of removing the 
age restriction for gender-affirming coverage.  New York has 
estimated the cost of extending coverage of gender-affirming 
healthcare to individuals above the age of eighteen as $6,737,000.353  
The estimate was based on the number of Medicaid recipients who 
receive mental health services with a diagnosis of gender dysphoria 
                                                                                                                 
with their most profound sense of self. They need to give substance to their sense of 
personal identity; it cannot be a purely inner and silent experience.”). 
 351. Id. (“If gender dysphoric children grow up without any acknowledgement of a 
major dimension of their subjectivity (if it is kept secret) or with responses that are 
incredulous, disgusted or dismissive, they will lack the necessary support to do 
identity work, to build up ‘identity capital.’”). 
 352. COHEN-KETTENIS & PFÄFFLIN, supra note 47, at 140. 
 353. N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra NOTE 267. 
132 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
and the number of those recipients who would seek hormone therapy 
only, partial gender affirming surgery, or full gender affirming 
surgery.354  States could conceivably make similar calculations to 
determine the cost of extending Medicaid coverage to transgender 
youth. 
Given the basis of New York’s calculation for the cost of extending 
Medicaid coverage to transgender recipients over the age of eighteen, 
it is unlikely that extending coverage to transgender youth would 
create additional costs beyond what is spent on covering adults.  The 
WPATH standards also make clear that adolescents experiencing GD 
still may not be ready or need hormone therapy until they are older.355  
Thus, lifting the restriction would not necessarily require the state to 
cover gender-affirming treatment for all adolescents who experience 
GD.  In addition, studies suggest that adolescents who experience 
gender dysphoria most often continue to experience it into adulthood 
and eventually seek gender-affirming healthcare.356  Removing the 
restrictions would therefore not add any significant new cost but, 
rather, would address the needs of transgender Medicaid recipients 
earlier.  While allowing youth to access gender-affirming healthcare 
would likely increase the cost to some extent, as there would be 
greater access to the treatment, this would likely be marginal. 
2. Removing the Age Restrictions Would Avoid Other Costs 
While removing the age restriction would be unlikely to increase 
the costs of extending coverage to individuals over the age of 
eighteen, increasing access to gender-affirming healthcare would 
likely avoid costs incurred by delaying treatment.  Studies indicate 
that earlier treatment may be more effective at alleviating GD, as 
individuals have not fully developed the secondary sex characteristics 
that cause them distress.357  As a result, earlier treatment may prevent 
necessity for later, more expensive surgical procedures such as gender 
affirming surgery.358  Therefore, in states such as New York, removing 
the age restriction might avoid the cost of covering these procedures 
in some cases, which would be more expensive than early hormone 
therapy.359 
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In addition to avoiding the cost of gender affirming surgery, 
providing access to gender-affirming healthcare for transgender youth 
would also avoid costs that are incurred to treat comorbid conditions 
of GD.  By treating GD earlier, states would likely see savings related 
to mental health.360  Mental health experts have noted that the 
emotional and developmental arrest caused by GD is best treated 
earlier.361  Therefore, removing the age restrictions might avoid the 
costs of mental health measures, such as mental health counseling, 
that might otherwise be incurred where individuals experience GD 
for a longer period of time.  Additionally, removing the age 
restrictions on Medicaid coverage would avoid the costs associated 
with life-threatening behavior, such as suicides and suicide 
attempts.362  Life-threatening behavior, such as suicide attempts, also 
present a significant cost to medical centers and local governments.363  
Nationally, the economic costs for nonfatal injuries due to self-harm 
are estimated at $3 billion a year for medical care.364  New York alone 
reported that treating suicide attempts cost the state around $200 
million in 2010.365  Given the statistics that show transgender youth 
having a higher occurrence of suicide attempts than the cisgender 
population, it is likely that a reduction in suicide attempts by 
transgender youth would produce a significant decrease in the state’s 
costs associated with suicide and attempted suicides.  Research 
indicates that hormone therapy and gender affirming surgery greatly 
improve outcomes for transgender youth and reduce the rate of 
clinical mental conditions.366  Therefore, removing the age restrictions 
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would likely avoid costs that would be incurred to treat attempted 
suicides. 
While there are cost justifications for extending Medicaid coverage 
of gender-affirming healthcare to transgender youth, any cost 
incurred by a state may not be dispositive of extending coverage.  The 
purpose of the Medicaid Act is to help Americans obtain medically 
necessary treatment that they cannot afford.367  A cost-benefits 
analysis cannot therefore be determinative of Medicaid coverage.  
Rather, the decision to extend Medicaid coverage to gender-affirming 
healthcare should turn on the recognition that it is medically 
necessary.  Given that the medical community and federal 
government recognize that youth may need gender-affirming 
healthcare, state Medicaid programs should extend coverage of this 
treatment pursuant to the ultimate objectives of the Medicaid Act. 
CONCLUSION 
The past three years have seen enormous strides in strengthening 
and improving the rights of transgender people.  So much so, that 
each of the past three years has been dubbed a “tipping point” for the 
trans-rights movement, or the year of transgender visibility.368  Once 
seen exclusively as comical or disturbing, transgender people and 
bodies are now more visible throughout mainstream media.369  A 
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study by GLAAD found that from 2002–2012, transgender characters 
were disproportionately portrayed as villains, psychopathic killers, sex 
workers, or victims.370  In more recent years, critically acclaimed 
programs such as “Transparent” and  “Orange is the New Black” 
have removed transgender characters from the fringes, portraying 
them instead as multidimensional individuals.371  Transgender actors 
such as Laverne Cox have been inspiring examples of success among 
the trans community.372  Transgender models such as Jazz Jennings 
and Andreja Pejic are finding success, earning spreads or contracts 
with notable magazines and companies.373  The process of transition 
has also become more visible, and perhaps socially acceptable, as pop 
culture icons such as Caitlyn Jenner openly discuss their process.374  
President Obama also noted in his January 21, 2015 State of the 
Union Address the need to protect the rights of transgender 
individuals, the first time a United States President has acknowledged 
transgender identities in the nationally televised speech.375 
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In addition to a shift in cultural norms, trans-rights advocates have 
succeeded in changing laws and policies that had previously denied 
transgender individuals’ basic rights.  Legal advocacy organizations, 
such as LAMDA, the Sylvia Rivera Project, the Legal Aid Society, 
and the New York Legal Assistance Group, have brought legal 
challenges to discriminatory practices and policies.376  Courts, in turn, 
have begun to recognize employment discrimination on the basis of 
gender identity as violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.377  
Activists and allies have brought greater visibility to trans-rights 
issues by launching powerful direct action and social media campaigns 
aimed at challenging marginalizing policies, such as gendered public 
accommodations.378  These changes have come about rapidly, as the 
APA only reclassified GD so as to remove the label of “disorder” in 
2012.  Thus, the trans-rights movement has fundamentally altered 
public policy and opinions surrounding the rights and lives of 
transgender individuals. 
Despite these advances, transgender individuals, and in particular 
transgender people of color, still find themselves subjected to 
discrimination, hate, and violence.  In early 2015, advocacy 
organizations noted a disturbing trend of transphobic hate crimes.379  
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Within the first three months of the year, Human Rights Campaign 
reported seven murders of transgender women, and all but one of the 
women killed were women of color.380  Such events suggest that 
society has not yet fully embraced transgender identities.  
Transgender youth still remain constant targets of harassment, abuse, 
and rejection, as is tragically evidenced by news reports of 
transgender youth who commit suicide.381  These events continue well 
after Leelah Alcorn’s words, “[f]ix society,” captured the public’s 
attention.382 
Enacting state Medicaid programs that provide low-income 
transgender youth with coverage of gender-affirming healthcare 
would improve the lives of this group of transgender individuals by 
providing access to medically necessary healthcare and by leaving a 
lasting impact on the way society views transgender identity.  The 
medical community has recognized that one’s gender identity may not 
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correspond with one’s assigned sex at birth, and that individuals, 
including youth, may experience clinically significant distress termed 
gender dysphoria.  Despite the fact that medical experts agree that 
gender-affirming healthcare may be medically necessary for some 
transgender youth, some states, such as New York, do not extend 
Medicaid coverage for gender dysphoria for individuals under the age 
of eighteen.  Age restrictions on Medicaid coverage give rise to 
possible violations of the Medicaid Act, legal claims under the 
Affordable Care Act, contradictions with principles of informed 
consent, and a myriad of negative outcomes.  States could avoid these 
issues by aligning their programs with the WPATH Standards of 
Care, and doing so would avoid a number of costs and provide 
individuals with care that they need but cannot afford. 
Providing transgender youth with access to affordable transition 
healthcare, however, would also create a lasting impact on society’s 
view of transgender identity.  States have already recognized the 
medical necessity of gender-affirming healthcare for adults, and in 
doing so have recognized that transitioning is a process that many 
individuals must go through in order to live happy and functional 
lives.  By extending this coverage to transgender youth, states would 
recognize the existence of gender non-conforming youth.  It would 
encourage private insurers to extend similar coverage, which in turn 
would motivate healthcare providers, employers, and schools to 
recognize gender non-conforming youth.  In short, extending 
Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming healthcare to transgender 
youth would validate gender non-conforming identities.  While the 
immediate impact of this validation may be seen in the healthcare 
that transgender youth receive, the ramifications would likely be seen 
on a much broader, social level. 
 
